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INTRODUCTION

One of the more misunderstood concepts of Anglo-American law is the
discovery doctrine . That is unfortunate, since the discovery doctrine is the
bedrock principle by which Europeans rationalized their presence in North
America. Its misinterpretation led to unwarranted assumptions about the
relationship between the federal government and the indigenous Indian
tribes in the late nineteenth century and to misinterpretations abroad, most
notably in Australia .'
* Professor of Law, Lewis and Clark Law School . This Article originated in a presentation
prepared for an aboriginal rights conference at Murdoch University in Perth, Australia, in June 2002 . 1
thank Gaps Meyers for the opportunity to explore these issues. I also thank the participants in a Lewis
and Clark Law School faculty seminar, especially John Grant, Bob Miller, Joe Miller, and Dan Roulf
for their helpful comments on a laterversion of this Article, which was delivered to the Lewis and Clark
conference entitled "From the Corps of Disovery, to the Doctrine of Discovery, and Beyond : The
Legacy of the Lewis and Clark Expedition in Indian Law, on May 6, 2004,
1 . See, e .g., Milirtpunt v . Nabaleo Pty . Ltd (1971) 17 F .L .R . 141, 200, 244 (concluding
erroneously that Australia land title had been acquired by settling uninhabited lands ; therefore,
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The discovery doctrine was a principle of international law which
sought to reconcile European notions of land ownership and sovereignty
with aboriginal possession. When adopted as municipal law, it became the
vehicle to validate transfers from Indian peoples to non-Indians in a country
that was rapidly growing and consuming land 2 Although it has been
argued that the discovery doctrine "proved itself to be a perfect instrument
of empire,"3 it was the misinterpretation of the doctrine by judges and
Congress in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that produced
this result . It was not an inevitable product of the doctrine itself.4 Had the
discovery doctrine been properly confined to the results of the cases that
aboriginal people had no cognizable land rights) ; ALEX C . CASTLES, AN AUSTRALIAN LEGAL HISTORY
515-19 (1982) (discussing the widely held view at the time of Australia's colonization that Aborigines
had no legally cognizable right to their tribal lands); R .D . Lumb, Aboriginal Land Rights : Judicial
Approaches in Perspective, 62 AUSTRALIAN L .J. 273, 273-80, 283 (1988) (examining Australian High
Court's opinions delineating the relationship between the colonizing government and the Aborigines)_
The Mifrrpum decision was substantially overruled by the Australian High Court in Mabo v.
Queensland [No. 21 (1992) 175 C .L .R. 1, 42 . See Gary D . Meyers & John Mugambwa, The Mabo
Q
Decision Australian Aboriginal Land Rights in Transition, 23 ENVTL . L . 1203, 1205 (1993) (noting that
in Mabo the High Court of Australia "rejected the doctrine of terra nullius," which had effectively
deprived Aboriginal peoples the full extent of their property rights in their tribal lands) .
2 . See Robert N . Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of Conquest : A Vision Quest for a
Decolonized I"ederal Indian Law, 46 ARK. L. Rev. 77, 93 (1993) [hereinafter Clinton, Redressing the
Legacy of Conquest] (referencing the discovery doctrine as a requirement for the achievement of
harmony between "aboriginal oempation and title with the English legal system of property") .
3 . ROBERT A . WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT : THE
DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST 325 (1990) (describing the discovery doctrine as "a racist colonizing rule of
law") .
4 . Professor Williams does not agree :
The Doctrine of Discovery was nothing more than the reflection of a set of
Eurocentric racist beliefs elevated to the status of a universal principle-one
culture's argument to support its conquest and colonization of a newly
discovered, alien world .
. . . the Doctrine of Discovery must be rejected. It permits the West to
accomplish by law and in good conscience what it accomplished by the sword in
earlier eras : the physical and spiritual destruction of indigenous people .
Id. at 326. Professor Williams' chief contemporary objection to the discovery doctrine is that it makes
indigenous peoples' claims for territory and self-government matters of exclusive national concern
before domestic courts and legislatures, not as legitimate concerns for international legal and political
forums . Id. at 327 . This is not an insignificant criticism, as it basically asserts that the venue in which
Indian title issues was all-important and, in light of developments after the Marshall Court decisions
described in this Article, it is hard to quarrel with that assertion . Nevertheless, this Article maintains
that those subsequent decisions are not the responsibility of the Marshall Court, which crafted the
discovery doctrine, but rather that the responsibility for decisions like Lone Wolfv. Hitchcock, 187 U .S.
553, 565-66 (1903) (upholding the unilateral abrogation of a treaty by Congress under the so-called
federal plenary power doctrine) and Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U .S . 272, 288-89 (1955)
(disallowing compensation for the extinguishment of Indian title), lies with the Courts (and generations),
which produced them . See also infra notes 23, 172, 185, 299 (discussing Lone Wall), 15, 185, 300, and
accompanying text (discussing Tee-Hit-Ton Indians) .
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made it part of the common law, its legacy today would be considerably
less pernicious .
The discovery doctrine, which received judicial ratification in a series
of opinions over twenty-five years by Chief Justice John Marshall, had both
proprietary and sovereign implications .5 Failure to distinguish between
these two dimensions can lead students of Indian law and history to
overestimate the effect of the doctrine on Indian property rights . In fact,
this paper maintains that the doctrine's interpretation by later Courts and
Congresses had a much greater effect on Indian sovereignty than on Indian
property rights . The discovery doctrine restricted tribal sovereignty by
giving the discovering nation the right to exclude European competitors,
foreclosing relations between them and the resident Indians! In the hands
of the Marshall Court, this "actual state of things," in the words of Chief
Justice Marshall, ripened into an exclusive federal control over Indian
affairs .8 Later Courts and Congresses used this precedent to erect a federal
plenary power doctrine of questionable authority that allowed Congress to
breach treaties and break up Indian lands .9
In contrast to the disastrous effects the discovery doctrine eventually
had on tribal sovereignty, the doctrine's immediate effect on Indian
proprietary rights was much less pernicious . The doctrine gave the
discovering nation the sovereign right to establish rules regarding the
acquisition of native proprietary rights .'° Under the Anglo-American
version of the doctrine, the discoverer gained the sovereign right to exclude
other Europeans, and it also obtained the exclusive right to obtain native
lands, the equivalent of an exclusive right of preemption, a proprietary
right." The government's right of preemption limited the Indians'
5 . See Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of Conquest, supra note 2, at 93-94 (describing how
the discovery doctrine affected Indian property rights and essentially brought Indians under colonial
sovereign power by limiting their ability to convey their property).
6. See infra notes 9-23, 212-216, 293-300, 391-407 and accompanying text.
7 . See Johnson v . M'Intosh, 21 U.S . (8 Wheat .) 543, 573-74 (1823); see also infra Part 111 .
8 . See Worcester v . Georgia, 31 U .S . (6 Pet .) 515, 546, 557-60 (1832) ; see also infra notes
244-281 and accompanying text .
9 . See infra notes 23, 292-98 and accompanying text .
10 . See Milner S . Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes, 1987 AM . B . FOUND. REs. J . l, 24
[hereinafter Ball, Constitution] (analyzing the discovery doctrine's effect on the sovereignty of Indian
tribes) ; Eric Kades, The Dark Side of Efficiency: Johnson v . M'Intosh and the Expropriation of
American Indian Lands, 148 U . PA. L. REV. 1065, 1074 (2000) [hereinafter Kades, Dark Side]
("[S]trictly speaking, this discovery rule applied only among European nations . . . . ..) ; J. Youngblood
Henderson, Unraveling the Riddle ofAborigmal Title, 5 AM . INDIAN L. REv. 75, 93-96 (1977) (noting
that parties tracing title to a tribe have title enforceable only by that tribe) .
11 . Professors Ball, Kades, and Henderson, think that the discovery doctrine regulated only
relations between Europeans regarding land claims . Ball, supra note 10, at 24 ; Henderson ; supra note
10, at 93-96 ; Kades, Dark Side, supra note 10, at 1074 . That interpretation does not seem faithful to
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proprietary rights, imposing a partial restraint on the ability of the natives to
alienate their lands. This restraint on alienation was, however, the only
restriction the doctrine imposed on the proprietary rights of the natives;
otherwise, they retained what they previously had held . 12 Their rights were,
as the Supreme Court noted in 1835 and repeatedly reiterated, "as sacred
and as securely safeguarded as is fee simple absolute title."13 Thus, the
federal government had to enter into numerous treaties with Indian tribes in
order to secure land rights, and the vast majority of Indian titles were
acquired by purchase, not conquest . 14
Subsequent decisions-handed down over a century after the Marshall
Court's decisions-which concluded that aboriginal title was not protected
by a right of compensation for governmental takings, 15 and which ruled that
Justice Marshall's statement that, in addition to diminishing the natives' "rights to complete sovereignty,
as independent nations," the Indians' "power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to whomsoever
they pleased, was denied by the original fundamental principle, that discovery gave [the discoverer]
exclusive title to those who made it" Johnson, 21 U.S . at 574. Therefore, it appears that Marshall
thought the discovery doctrine included a restraint on Indian alienation, the scope of which would be
determined by the discoverer's law . The Anglo-American rule he pronounced restricted alienation to
the government, but the French recognized at least some private purchases of Indian lands . Kades, Dark
Side, supra note 10, at 1075 . Perhaps it is more accurate to state that while the international discovery
doctrine concerned only relations among Europeans, the Anglo-American version of the discovery
doctrine included a governmental right of preemption, while the French interpretation did not
12 . See David W ilkins, Quil-Claiming the Doctrine ofDiscovery: A Treaty-Based Reappraisal,
23 OKIA . CITY U. L. REV. 277, 283 (1998) ("[T]he doctrine of discovery was merely an exclusive
preemptive rule that limited the rights of the discoverers or their successors and entailed no limitation on
the preexisting land title of tribes .") . I agree with Professor Wilkins' characterization of the discovering
European nation's proprietary interest as a right of preemption, but attached to this right of preemption
was a partial restraint on the Indians' rights of alienation, which limited the scope of their pre-existing
proprietary rights . And, as indicated in the text, 1 also think that the discovery doctrine granted the
discoverers sovereign power over the natives, the exercise of which turned out to have a large effect on
the natives' sovereignty .
13 . United States v . Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S . 11l, 117 (1938); see also Oneida Indian Nation
v . County of Oneida. 414 U.S . 661, 669 (1974) ; United States v . Alcea Band of Tilamooks, 329 U.S . 40,
46 (1946) ; Mitchel v . United States, 34 U.S . (9 Pet.) 711, 746 (1835) ("[T]heir right of occupancy is
considered as sacred as the fee simple of the whites.") .
14 . Felix S_ Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 MINN. L. REV. 28, 33-34 (1947) [hereinafter
Cohen, Original Title] (claiming that "except for a few tracts of land in the Southwest, practically all of
the public domain of the continental United States (excluding Alaska) has been purchased from the
Indians") . Compare id at 45-46 (noting that approximately $800 million was appropriated by Congress
to purchase Indian land), with id. at 35 (noting that fifteen million dollars was paid to Napoleon for
governmental authority over Louisiana, while more than twenty times that was paid to Indians to
purchase their possessory rights) . See also infra notes 197-98 (noting how exceptional instances of
conquest were).
15 . Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v . United States, 348 U.S . 272, 279 (1955); see Kenneth H. Bobroff,
Indian Law in Property: Johnson v. M'Intosh and Beyond, 37 TULSA L. REV. 521, 530 (2001)
(observing that in Tee-Iii-Ton, Justice Reed, writing for the Court, "stretched the holding in M'Intosh
far beyond the facts in the case and deployed language from the opinion to justify a result that it never
called for") ; see also infra note 185.
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aboriginal title amounted to no more than a defeasible usufructuary right, l6
were not rooted in the doctrine that the Marshall Court created. They were
encouraged, however, by the rhetoric of Chief Justice Marshall, who
mislabeled the property interests of the tribes and the government. This
mislabeling, which occurred originally in Fletcher v. Peck-a case that was
only incidentally about Indian property rights l'-allowed later courts to
fundamentally misconstrue the nature of the proprietary rights retained by
the natives.
If the effects of the discovery doctrine on native property rights were
greatly expanded generations after the Marshall Court, the doctrine's
implications on native sovereignty were evident almost immediately after
the Court handed down the most famous of its decisions, Worcester v.
Georgia, in 1832 . 18 Worcester, generally celebrated as a landmark victory
for Indian tribes,l) preempted state laws within Indian reservations and
recognized exclusive federal control over Indian affairs . ' However, this
federal preemption did not benefit the Cherokee tribe-whose sovereignty
was at stake in the case-at all, as the federal government simply pursued
the same removal policies favored by the state .2' Moreover, the federal
authority recognized by Worcester was interpreted by the Supreme Court a
half-century later to erect a doctrine of plenary federal power over natives. 2
This extra-constitutional authority23 was subsequently employed to destroy
tribal governments and territory, which is why this Article claims that the
discovery doctrine, as laid down by the Marshall Court, ultimately had
more pernicious consequences on tribal sovereignty than on tribal property
rights .
This Article explores the discovery doctrine, its effect on aboriginal
property rights and sovereignty, and the consequent impetus to treaty16 .

See Milirrpum,

17

F .L .A . at 244-46, 263 .

The Mifrrpum decision was effectively

overturned by the Australia High Court in Mahn, 107 A.L .R . at 56 (recognizing the existence of native
title, but denying that its extinguishment required compensation) .
17 .

Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U .S . (6 Crunch) 87, 142-43 (1810); see also infra notes 81-109 and

accompanying text.
18 .

Worcester v . Georgia, 31 U .S. (6 Pet .) 515 (1832) .

19 .

See, e .g., CHARLES F . WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW: NATIVE

SOCIETIES IN A MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 30-31, 55-59 (1987) .

infra notes

20 .

See

21 .

FELIX S . COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 130 (Rennard Strickland et al,

252-71 and accompanying text .

eds ., 1982) [hereinafter COHEN TREATISE] .
22 .

See

infra notes 292-98 and

accompanying text.

See Robert N . Clinton, There is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 ARIZ .
ST. L .L 113, 116-17 (2002) [hereinafter Clinton, No Federal Supremacy] (maintaining that the federal
plenary power doctrine established by Lone Wolf v. United States, 187 U .S. 553 (1903), and other cases,
23 .

had no basis in the text, history, or theory of the

U .S.

Constitution) .
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making . The Article contends that the discovery doctrine-an international
law principle adopted into the common law by the Marshall Court left
Indian tribes with nearly all of their proprietary rights, although it did lay
the groundwork for substantial future erosion of the tribes' sovereign
authority through Chief Justice Marshall's mislabeling of Indian property
rights and his reliance on federal control over Indian sovereignty. Later
diminishment of those rights were not, however, a necessary product of the
discovery doctrine articulated by the Marshall Court. While it may be true
that the discovery doctrine instituted "a language of juridicial discourse that
would . . . rationalize the process of `manifest destiny' and provide the
24
conceptual space for the forced extinguishment of Indian lands," this
Article maintains that the Marshall Court's discovery doctrine did not by
itself produce these results. Instead, it was subsequent Courts and
Congresses that used the rhetoric employed by the Marshall Court to
produce results that Chief Justice Marshall and a majority of his colleagues
would not have endorsed .
Section I of this Article traces the origins of the discovery doctrine .
Sections 11 through IV examine the Marshall Court's adoption of the
doctrine, and the related concepts of aboriginal title and native sovereignty,
as part of the common law in a series of early nineteenth century opinions .
Although most of the attention of discovery doctrine scholars has been
directed to what has become known as the Marshall Trilogy of Indian law
cases,25 section II maintains that the misidentification of the pertinent
property interests possessed by the Indians and the discoverers occurred
over a decade earlier, in the 1810 case of Fletcher v. Peck .26 Section V
proceeds to discuss the legacy of the Marshall Court's decisions, one of
which-explored in section VI-was an impetus to treaty-making, in which
tribes reserved important rights to natural resources. Section VII explains a
modem alternative to the erosion of inherent tribal sovereignty, which the
discovery doctrine initiated : delegated sovereignty under the federal
pollution control statutes . The Article closes by drawing some conclusions
about the importance of an accurate understanding of the discovery
24 . Howard R . Berman, The Concept of Aboriginal Rights in the Early Legal History of the
United States, 27 Burr. L . REv. 637, 655-56 (1978) .
25 . See, e .g, Philip P . Frickey,Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionaltsm,
and Interpretation in Federal Indian Larv, 107 HARv . L. REV. 381 (1993) [hereinafter Friekey,
Marshalling] (analyzing the interpretive approach adopted by Chief Justice Marshall in Johnson, 21
U .S, (8 Wheat .) 543, Cherokee Nation v . Georgia, 30 U .S . (5 Pet .) 1 (1831), and Worcester, 31 U .S . (6
Pet) 515, and comparing them to Marshall's interpretation of the U .S . Constitution); WILKINSON, supra
note 19, at 24 (identifying the three Marshall decisions as the "Marshall Trilogy") .
26 . Fletcher v . Peck, 10 U .S . (6 Cranch) 87 (1810) .
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doctrine, aboriginal title, and native sovereignty in Indian Country in the
twenty-first century.
I. TIIE ORIGINS OF THE DISCOVERY DOCTRINE

The roots of the discovery doctrine lie in the medieval Catholic
Church's efforts to impose the authority of the Pope over non-Christian
"heathens and infidels" who occupied the Holy Lands of the Middle East 27
The papally directed Crusades of the eleventh through the thirteenth
centuries were justified by the perceived need to replace the ruling infidels
with Christian believers whose power would derive from, and be subject to,
the Pope in Rome. 8 Although the Crusades proved to be military failures,
they prompted a number of legal opinions justifying the assertion of papal
authority over non-believers on the basis of Christian "natural law .  29
These principles were soon applied to aboriginal peoples in newly
discovered territories. For example, in 1436, the Pope granted Portugal
exclusive authority to colonize all of Africa . 30 This monopoly caused other
European colonizers to seek papal sanction for colonizing elsewhere, and,
in 1493, Pope Alexander IV gave Spain the right to colonize and
Christianize tribal peoples in the vicinity of Columbus's discoveries in the
Western Hemisphere . 31 Spain's ensuing colonization devastated native
populations. 32 For example, in Hispaniola, the indigenous population
declined by around 95% within two decades, from 250,000 to fewer than
15,000 33 Spanish colonial law invoked papal authority to announce to
Indian tribes that if they did not submit to the power of the Catholic Church
and its pope, Spanish conquistadors would wage war against them .3' And
they did; frequently, with devastating results. 35

27 . Robert A . Williams, Jr., Columbus's Legacy: Law as an Instrument of Racial
Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples' Rights of Self-Determination, 8 ARIZ. J . INT'L R COMP . L .

51, 61 (1991) [hereinafter Williams, Columbus's Legacy] .
28 . WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 15 .
29, See DAVID 13. GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 43 (4th
ed . 1998) (quoting from Pope Innocent IV, explaining the circumstances under which the Pope could
punish infidels, including declaring war against them) .
30 . Williams, Columbus's Legacy, supra note 27, at 61, 64 .
31 . GETCHES ET AL ., supra note 29, at 46 .
32 . Id. at 47 .
33 . WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 85 .
34 . GETCHES ET AL., supra note 29, at 47-48 (quoting from THE SPANISH TRADITION IN
AMERICA 58-60 (Charles Gibson ed ., 1968)) .
35 . See WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 92-93 (describing Spain's justification for using military
force against the Indians and characterizing the conquistadors' attacks as "acts of genocide") .
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In 1532, the Spanish theologian and jurist Franciscus de Victoria,
professor of theology at the University of Salamanca and a frequent advisor
to the Spanish Crown, challenged the prevailing orthodoxy. In a series of
lectures entitled "On the Indians Lately Discovered," Victoria applied
Thomas Aquinas's natural law theory to relations between countries. 6 He
maintained that even heretics and sinners had natural law rights to property,
which could not be taken simply because they refused to subscribe to the
Christian religion . 7 Moreover, he contended that the Pope's attempt to
grant America to Spain had no effect on native property rights ." Only
transgressions of the Law of Nations by the natives could justify a war of
conquest and the establishment of a colonial empire by a European power. 39
To the notion that Europeans held land title by discovery, Victoria
responded that the natives were actually the "true owners," and their failure
to recognize the authority of the Pope was not grounds for waging war on
them .4° The Pope had no authority over Indians; all his division of the
world between Portugal and Spain accomplished, according to Victoria,
was to allocate trading and proselytizing areas .41 But he maintained that the
European civilizers owed a duty of guardianship under the Law of Nations,
including bringing the message of Christianity to them, and that if "Indian
princes" stood in the way of the message of missionaries, Spaniards would
be justified in "seizing the land and territory of the natives and . . . setting
up new lords . . . with an intent directed more to the welfare of the
aborigines than to their own gain."42 Victoria's notions were largely
adopted five years later, in 1537, by Pope Paul III, who proclaimed:

36 . Id at 98 .
37 . Felix S. Cohen, The Spanish Origin of Indian Rights in the Law of the United States, 31
GEo. L.J. 1, I1-12 (1942) [hereinafter Cohen, Spanish Origin] ; see also Cordon 1 . Bennett, Aboriginal
Title in the Common Law: A Stony Path Through Feudal Doctrine, 27 BUFF . L. REv. 617, 619 (1978)
(noting that Victoria was the first to apply to native lands the Roman principle that possessory title was a
rule of natural law) .
38 . GETCHES ET AL ., supra note 29, at 49 (citing FRANCISCUS DE VICTORIA, DE INDIS ET DE
IVRE BELLI RELECTIONES 128, 137, 139 (Ernest Nys ed . & John Pawley Bate traps., 1917)) .
39 . WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 97 . Professor Williams provided a detailed analysis of
Victoria's lectures. See id. at 98-108 . The "law of nations" to which the natives were bound included
the right of Spaniards to travel, to humane treatment as visitors, and the right to economically exploit
native lands, so long as no damage was done to native rights. See also GETCHES ET AL, supra note 29,

at 50-51 .
40 . See GETCHES ET AL ., supra note 29, at 49-50 (citing VICTORIA, supra note 38, at 128, 137,
139) .
41 . See Cohen, Original Title, supra note 14, at 44 .
42 . See GETCHES ET AL, supra note 29, at 51 (citing Victoria, supra note 38, at 157-58); see
also Wilkins, supra note 12, at 286 (noting that Victoria also asserted that the Indians had to allow the
Spanish the right to travel through their lands and to trade with them).
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Indians and all other people who may later be discovered by
Christians, are by no means to be deprived of their liberty or the
possession of their property, even though they be outside the
faith of Jesus Christ; and that they may and should, freely and
legitimately, enjoy their liberty and the possession of their
43
property . . .
Victoria's theory of native rights, based on respect for native
possession and native consent to European acquisition of title, became an
accepted part of international law during the era of North American
colonization. Felix Cohen, the great synthesizer of American Indian law,
observed that Indian law originated in international law, noting that the
1933 Pan-American Conference proclaimed Victoria as the person who
"established the foundations of modern international law."44 Cohen traced
to Victoria the American law notions of equality between Indians and
whites, tribal self-government, federal sovereignty in Indian affairs, and
governmental protection of Indians .45
Early English and Dutch settlements in North America largely adhered
to Victoria's notion that Indian consent was required for land acquisition,
and purchase through treaty was the common practice .46 No doubt the
reality that the Indian tribes were militarily strong and numerous
contributed to this custom . 47 The practice of obtaining Indian consent
through purchase proceeded, despite Crown grants "contain[ing] sweeping
assertions of legal title," because it was understood that these grants
functioned only to exclude other Europeans from purchasing Indian
possessory rights .4s Purchase through treaty reflected three important
assumptions: (1) both parties were sovereigns ; (2) the tribes had title to
convey ; and (3) the acquisition of Indian land was a governmental
function .49
The British Crown left native affairs largely to the local or colonial
level until the onset of the French and Indian War in 1754.5° Most tribes
43 .
44 .
45 .
46 .

See Cohen, Original Title, supra note 14, at 45 (citing BULL SUBLIMIS DEUS (1537)).
Cohen, Spanish Origin, supra note 37, at 17.
COHEN TREATISE, supra note 21, at 52-53, n21 .
See Id. at 53-54. Some Puritans in Massachusetts believed that Crown grants abrogated

Indian title, so that settlement could proceed in advance of Indian consent. But even those who held this
view believed that the lands should be purchased from the Indians . Id. at 54 .
47 . Id. at 55 ("The necessity of getting along with powerful Indian tribes, who outnumbered
the European settlers for several decades, dictated that as a matter of prudence, the settlers buy lands
that the Indians were willing to sell, rather than displace them by other methods .").
48 . Id. at 55-56.
49 . Id. at 53 .
50 . Id. at 57 .
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sided with the French, due to encroachments on their lands by British
American settlers and frequent fraudulent dealings through which the
Indians lost their land .51 In an effort to keep some tribes from aligning with
the French, Britain prohibited colonists from settling on tribal land or
hunting grounds west of the Appalachian Mountains, a policy that kept the
strategically located Iroquois Confederacy in the British camp 5 2 After the
war was won, the Crown concluded that it could not trust the colonists to
not encroach on Indian lands, so it promulgated King George III's Royal
Proclamation of 1763 53
The proclamation continued the wartime
prohibition on settlement west of the mountains in an effort to avoid costly
.54
frontier wars
In effect, the proclamation was the first declaration of
Indian country . 55 Henceforth, no private land sales with Indians would be
permitted without Crown approval, and all Indian traders had to be
.56 This centralization of Indian affairs represented a sharp break
licensed
from the Crown's previous tolerance of colonial initiatives concerning
Indian lands. Clearly, London did not want to risk losing control over the
Northwest lands that it had just won by allowing land speculators to
57
continue to create friction on the frontier by purchasing Indian lands.
The colonists resented this centralization of Indian affairs." They
viewed it as an infringement on their fundamental freedom to speculate on
western lands, and the ban helped fan the fires of revolution .59 Many
prominent citizens who were land speculators ignored it, George
60 When London decided to finance a plan to
Washington among them .
implement the proclamation, which included staffing a number of forts
along the frontier, with a stamp tax on legal documents, bills of lading, land
grants, newspapers, and the like, the effect was to radicalize a generation of
British Americans. A number of colonial legislatures denounced the Stamp

51 . GETCHES Et AL, supra note 29, at 58 .
52 . Id.
53 . Id. at 58-59 .
54 . Id. ; see generally Robert N. Clinton, The Proclamation of 1763; Colonial Prelude to Two
Centuries of Federal-State Conflict Over the Management of Indian Affairs, 69 B .U. L . REV. 329,356
(1989) [hereinafter Clinton, Proclamation] (noting that the proclamation of 1763 "represented the first
legal demarcation of Indian country_" or, "the crest of the Appalachian Mountains") .
55 . See Robert N. Clinton, The Dormant Indian Commerce Clause, 27 Cony . L. REV. 1055,
1090 (1995) [hereinafter Clinton, Dormant Commerce] ("[T]he crest of the Appalachian Mountains . . .
established the first legal definition of Indian Country"),
56 . Id, at 1091 .
57 . WILLIAMS, supra note 3,at238 .
58 . GETCBES ET AL., supra note 29, at 59, 63-64 .
59 . Id. at 6,4
60 . Id. at 59 .

2004]

Retracing the Discovery Doctrine

72 3

Act as an unlawful internal tax or as taxation without representation . 61 In
Boston, there was rioting in the streets. Although Parliament soon repealed
the Stamp Act, the proclamation remained in effect .62
Western land speculators claimed that the King lacked the authority to
interfere with their freedom to purchase Indian lands. 63 Echoing Victoria,
they argued that the proclamation was also inconsistent with the natural
rights of the Indians to sell their lands, although it is clear that the natives'
natural law rights mattered less to the speculators than their own selfinterest64 Included among those speculators was William Murray, who had
purchased prime lands directly from Indian chiefs and whose successors in
interest would later bring the famous case of Johnson v. M'Intosh .61
Although the results of the Revolutionary War made the policies of the
British Crown concerning Indian lands legally irrelevant to the settlement
of the western lands, the war did not settle the central issue of whether
speculators could purchase Indian lands. At the outset of the war, Virginia,
which claimed western lands all the way to the Pacific Ocean under its
royal charter, contended that its legislature had to approve all purchases of
Indian lands, a policy threatening to speculators like Murray . 6' However,
Maryland, a state without western land claims (but home to several
prominent land speculators), refused to ratify the Articles of Confederation
until the issue of western land purchases was resolved .67 As a result, the
Articles included a provision that gave Congress "the sole and exclusive
right and power" to regulate trade and manage Indian affairs "provided that
the legislative right of any State within its own limits be not infringed or
61 . WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 242 . Professor Williams estimated that the cost of maintaining
British forces in America after the French and Indian War was nearly 500,000 pounds annually, while
the annual interest on the national debt (which had ballooned from 73 to 137 million pounds) was five
million pounds, at a time when Britain's annual budget averaged just eight million pounds . Id. at 24 t .
62 . Id. a t 245 .
63 . In their argument, the speculators cited the Camden-Yorke opinion, the 1757 commentary
to the Privy Council by the Attorney General and the Solicitor General on colonists' rights to acquire
frontier land from natives without the consent of the Crown, which maintained that individuals could
purchase lands from native rulers without Crown authorization. Although the opinion dealt only with
colonizing in India, British Americans edited it (removing specific references to India) and adapted it to
their own situation to argue that they did not need the Crown's approval to obtain title to Indian lands .
WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 275-79 .
64 . Id. at 271-74, 279-80, 287, 298-300, 303-305 .
65, Johnson v . M'Intosh, 21 U .S . (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); see also infra Part Ill .
66 . See WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 290 (discussing Virginia's 1776 constitutional
convention's resolution rejecting private purchases of Indian lands without legislative approval) . Two
years later, the Virginia legislature declared unlawful any previous Indian land purchases that did not
have legislative approval . Id. at 294 .
67 . Id. at 294 (noting that Maryland refused to ratify the Articles unless Congress had the
power to establish the boundaries of states with western land claims like Virginia) .

724

Vermont Law Review

[Vol, 28:713

violated ."6' This provision was later interpreted to allow states to control
the purchase of Indian lands within their boundaries, 69 which made the
states with expansive western land claims, like Virginia, quite powerful .
During the war, the Continental Congress attempted to maintain good
relations with the Indian tribes . In this vein, like the British Crown,
Congress centralized control over Indian affairs in the federal
government70 The United States soon signed its first treaty with an Indian
tribe: a 1778 treaty with the Delaware Indians, which guaranteed the
Delawares and their heirs "all their teritoreal rights in the fullest and most
ample manner. "7' After the war, Congress agreed to a series of treaties in
which it promised the signatory tribes protective custody as dependent
wards and stipulated that the tribes would not be disturbed in possession of
their lands ; one treaty even provided that any U.S . citizen who settled on
2
Many of these early
Indian territory would forfeit federal protection.
treaties contained provisions expressly giving the United States the first
option to purchase Indian lands; that is, a right of preemption 73 A notable
treaty was the 1785 Treaty of Hopewell, which gave Congress the exclusive
power of regulating trade with and controlling the affairs of the Cherokee

68 . U .S . ART'S . OF CONFED ., art . IX, para . 4 . The relevant portions of the paragraph read :
The United States in Congress assembled shall also have the sole and exclusive
right and power of . . . regulating the trade and managing all affairs with the
Indians, not members of any of the States, provided that the legislative right of
any State within its own limits be not infringed or violated . . . .
Id. For the legislative history of this provision, see Clinton, Dormant Commerce, supra note 55, at
1098-1105 (suggesting that the state proviso was likely intended to be a narrow exception for state
jurisdiction over non-Indian state citizens and over activities not involving Indians but within Indian
country, but acknowledging that a "precise meaning of this. . . clause may be illusory").
69 . See, e_g., Oneida Indian Nation v. New York, 860 F .2d 1145, 1154 (2d Cir. 1988), cert
denied, 493 U .S . 871 (1989) . In Oneida Indian Nation, the Second Circuit held that Article IX of the
Articles of Confederation gave "states the power to purchase Indian land within their borders and
extinguish Indian title to such land so long as such activity did not interfere with Congress's paramount
powers over war and peace with the Indians ." Id. at 1154 . Therefore, according to the court,
congressional consent was not required for state purchases of Indian lands under the Articles . Id. at
1167 . But see Clinton, Dormant Commerce, supra note 55, at 1104-05 (suggesting a narrower
interpretation) .
70 . COHEN TREATISE, supra note 21, at 58 .
71 . See id. at 58-59 (quoting Treaty with the Deiewares, Sept 17, 1778, art. 6, 7 Star. 13) .
72 . See id, at 60 & nn .99, 102, 104 (discussing the Treaty with the Six Nations, Oct . 22, 1784,
7 Stat . 15 (Articles concluded at Fort Stanwix), the Treaty with the Wyandots, Etc ., Jan . 21, 1785, art.
10, 7 Star. 16, 18 (Articles concluded at Fort M'Intosh), and the Treaty with the Shawanoe, Jan . 31,
1786, 7 Star . 26 (Articles concluded at at the Mouth of the Great Miami)) . For a summary of state
opposition to these treaties, see Clinton, Dormant Commerce, supra note 55, at 113-18 .
73 . See Wilkins, supra note 12, at 299-304 (discussing several treaties signed between 1789
and 1804, which Professor Wilkins suggests belie the claim that the United States thought discovery
vested a fee simple in the federal government).
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Nation 74 As Chief Justice Marshall later made clear, however, Congress
meant only to control the external affairs of the Cherokee, not the tribe's
internal affairs 75
Two years before the Treaty of Hopewell, in 1783, Virginia agreed to
cede its western lands to the federal government so long as such lands were
used for the common benefit of all the statesthis land cession effectively
began to federalize the issue of Indian title in the West76 In 1787, the
Continental Congress' most notable piece of legislation, the Northwest
Ordinance, not only provided a three-stage process for creating new states
out of the new federal lands of the Northwest, but also promised that the
federal government would exercise "the utmost good faith . . . toward the
Indians; their land and property" and would use western land sales (once
lands were acquired from the Indians) to pay off the nation's Revolutionary
War debt 77 The Constitutional Convention of 1787 included an Indian
Commerce Clause, which aimed to ratify this vesting of exclusive federal
jurisdiction over Indian affairs.'$ Three years later, Congress exercised that
constitutional authority when it enacted the first Trade and Intercourse Act
of 1790, also known as the Nonintercourse Act 79 The Act restricted trade

74, See COHEN TREATISE, supra note 21, at 61 . The Georgia state assembly protested the
treaty negotiations, recommending that its congressional delegation seek to revoke federal authority to
make treaties, and claimed that any treaties within the state violated slate sovereignty . Clinton, Dormant
Commerce, supra note 55, at 1115-16.
75, Worcester v . Georgia, 31 U.S . (6 Pet.) 515, 553-54 (1832) .
76. WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 305 (discussing the nature of the compromise between
Virginia and Congress regarding Virginia's cession of claims to lands north of Ohio) . Congress actively
debated federal-state relations concerning Indian affairs in 1786, culminating in the Ordinance of
August 7, 1786, which recognized that national authority over Indian affairs extended within states,
although it also recognized an uncertain amount of concurrent state authority. See Clinton, Dormant
Commerce, supra note 55, at 1121-24 .
77, Act of Aug. 7, 1787, eh . 8, 1 Stat . 50, 52 (enacting "lain Act to provide the Government of
the Territory North-west of the river Ohio"); see WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 306 . On this point
Professor Clinton concluded :
Thus, the evidence suggests that a majority view had also emerged in Congress
during the period of the confederation that those tribes that had previously
retained their tribal autonomy were in fact legally separate from and not subject to
the laws of the states or to state efforts to regulate their internal affairs .
Clinton, Dormant Commerce, supra note 55, at 1142 .
78 . U .S. CONST . art . t, § 8, cf . 3 (authorizing Congress to "regulate Commerce . . . with the
Indian Tribes") . For detailed consideration of the legislative history, see Clinton, Dormant Commerce,
supra note 55, at 1147-64, where Professor Clinton explains that James Madison was the primary
architect of the Indian Commerce Clause, which Madison viewed as preventing state encroachments on
the exclusive power of the federal gtvemment to regulate affairs with the Indian tribes .
79 . Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790, ch . 33, 1 Star. 137 (codified as amended in part at 25
U.S .C. § 177 (2000)) ("An Act to regulate trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes.") ; see County of
Oneida v . Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U .S . 226, 229 (1985) .
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with Indians to federal licensees and required that all sales of Indian land be
as a result of federal treaty . 0
Thus, by the turn of the nineteenth century the United States had
followed Britain's path in centralizing Indian land title issues . Both the
1787 Constitution and the 1790 legislation made Indian affairs an exclusive
federal function. The United States had also entered into several treaties in
which it promised to respect Indian possession . Further, the Northwest
Ordinance, which pledged that good faith would be a federal hallmark in
negotiations with Indian tribes, made protection of Indian land possession a
national policy . However, it was not clear if Indian land purchases by
speculators prior to the Constitution were valid. That question was left for
Supreme Court resolution.
.

JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF INDIAN TITLE : FLETCHER R PECK

The Marshall Court first discussed the nature of the title that Indian
tribes possessed in an unlikely 1810 case, involving the Georgia
legislature's 1795 authorization of a fraudulent sale of thirty-five million
acres to four land companies in what is now Alabama and Mississippi for
1 .5 cents an acre . 81 After it became widely known that virtually every
member of the legislature, along with several judges and members of
Congress, had been bribed, the election of 1796 saw most of the corrupted
legislators defeated at the polls, and the new legislature immediately
attempted to rescind the land grant and invalidate all land titles acquired
pursuant to it.82 One of the purchasers, John Fletcher, sued his seller, John
Peck, in what amounted to a collusive suit, 83 alleging breach of warranty of
title and seeking judicial invalidation of the legislative rescission. 14 By the
time the issue reached the Supreme Court, the Yazoo land sale had been the
subject of debate in Congress, in the nascent political parties, and in

80 . Ch . 33, §§ 1, 4, 1 Stat 137, 137-138. For more background on the Trade and Intercourse
Act, see COHEN TREATISE, supra note 21, at 109-17 (discussing ensuing Trade and Intercourse Acts,
including the first permanent legislation in 1802, and the current version, enacted in 1834).
81 . R. KENT NEWMYER,JOHN MARSHALL ANDTHEHEROICAGEOFTHESUPREME COURT 223
(2001) .

82, See generally id. at 222-39 (noting that "[wlhat made the Yezoo case unique was the
amount of land at stake and the magnitude and trueness of corruption involved") .
83 . See CHARLES GROVE HAINES, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS, 1789-1835, at 314 (1944) (describing how Fletcher, a New Hampshire
resident, sued Peck, a Massachusetts resident, to gain diversity jurisdiction for the purpose of bringing
the suit in federal court) .
84 . Fletcher v, Peck, 10 U .S. (6 Cranch) 87, 88 (1810) (invalid recession), 91 (breach of
contract) .
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newspapers for a decade and a half.85 The case invoked the great political
issues of the era, including republicanism, state sovereignty, and the role of
the courts in a democracy, and it also prompted enough concern over Indian
relations-due to the fact that the lands at issue were Indian title landsthat President Washington asked for a Senate investigation into the legality
of the sale. 6
In Fletcher v. Peck, the Court ruled, 4-1, in an opinion by Chief Justice
Marshall, that the state legislature could not rescind the grant without
violating the Constitution's Contract Clause . 87 According to Marshall,
Fletcher, as well as other purchasers, obtained "a title good at law" and was
ss
"innocent, whatever may be the guilt of others ." Thus, although Marshall
acknowledged that fraud and legislative corruption were "circumstances
most deeply to be deplored," and maintained that a court ordinarily would
set aside a fraudulent conveyance, the sale of land from Peck to Fletcher
involved a private transaction between innocent third parties, whom
Marshall claimed had no notice that Georgia was about to rescind the
statute authorizing the land sales 89 Consequently, the Chief Justice
concluded that the state legislature's attempt to rescind the corrupted statute
amounted to an unconstitutional interference with private contracts, a
decision which provoked allegations among Republicans that the Court
favored land speculators at the expense of state sovereignty and public
morality . 90
85 . NEWMYER, supra note 81, at 226 . In fact, the suit was "the centerpiece in a legal stratagem
designed by the speculators in the New England Mississippi Land Company to strengthen their ease"
before a land claims commission established by Congress to sort out the land claims . Id at 224 . For
information on the land claims commission, see infra note 95 . The Company's attack on the Georgia
legislature's attempted rescission was an effort to protect windfall profits of 650 percent on its initial
investment NEWMYER, supra note 81, at 224 .
86 . NEWMYER, supra note 81, at 224, 226 . Republicans generally denounced the sale, the
political corruption, and the land speculation ; they thought the issue put "the question of morality in
government . . . on the line." Id. a t 226 . The issue of federalism was also on the line, since the case
involved the power of a state legislature to overcome the effects of corruption versus the judicial
protection the federal courts gave to allegedly vested rights_ Id
87 . Fletcher, 10 U .S at 136, 142 .
88 . Id. at 133 .
89. Id. at 130-33 . Professor Newmyer suggests that, with all the publicity concerning the
Yazoo issue preceeding the Georgia elections of 1796, it was extremely unlikely that Fletcher was an
innocent purchaser without notice of the imminent revocation of the 1795 statute . NEWMYER, supra
note 81, at 227 . Peck, the seller, was a member of the New England Mississippi Land Company, a large
land speculation company, which surely was aware of the political uproar over the land sales. Id, at
227-28 . Marshall's characterization of the case as one involving a private contract between individuals
allowed him to avoid the bar of the recently enacted Eleventh Amendment, prohibiting federal court
suits against states, as the real aim of Fletcher was to challenge the state law rescinding the land sales .
Id. at 228 .
90 . Fletcher, 10 U.S . at 137-39 . On the politics of the case, see supra note 86.
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With public attention riveted on grand issues like political corruption,
land speculation, republican virtues, state sovereignty, and the sanctity of
private contracts, the Fletcher decision was not perceived to be centrally
about Indian land rights . And yet the nature of the rights Indians possessed
was in fact pivotal to the outcome of the case, for the initial state grant
purported to convey lands occupied by Indians to speculators9 1 The
attorneys for both Fletcher and Peck (represented by John Quincy Adams,
among others) characterized Indian title as not inconsistent with fee title in
either the State of Georgia or the federal government 92 The Indians of
course were not represented. Chief Justice Marshall agreed with the notion
that Indian title could coexist with state title in a few brief, unreflective
paragraphs, which clarified neither the nature of Indian title, nor how it
could be legitimately extinguished 93 Marshall stated only that Indian title
was to be respected until legitimately extinguished, and that this native
property interest was not inconsistent with "seisin in fee on the part of the
state .,,94 The ambiguities in the majority opinion were no doubt due to the
fact that Marshall perceived the central issues in the case to be the
constitutional protection afforded to private contract rights, and the Court's
.95
authority to overturn unconstitutional acts by a state legislature
The Chief Justice's characterization of the state's interest as a fee drew
a partial dissent from Justice Johnson, who thought that the state's property
interest was only "a mere possibility," while the Indians' interest was
All
the discovery doctrine gave the
absolute proprietorship of the soi196
state, according to Justice Johnson, was "a right of conquest or of purchase,
97
exclusively of all competitors." According to Justice Johnson, the state's
interest was not seisin in fee because it was not a present interest, but a
future interest: "nothing more than a power to acquire a fee-simple by

91 . Fletcher, 10 U.S . at 88 .
92 . See Berman, supra note 24, at 639 .
93 . Fletcher, 10 U.S, at 142-43 .
94. Id.
95 . See Berman, supra note 24, at 642 (citing HAINES, supra note 83, at 323-28) . The result
was, according to Professor Newmyer, part of Marshall's campaign to protect vested rights from state
legislative rescission, giving protection to commercial entreprenuers in dealings with sties . NEWMYER,
supra note 81, at 234-36 (noting that the Fletcher result corresponded with Marshall's personal interest
as a land speculator) . The ultimate resolution of the controversy involved Congress purchasing title to
the disputed lands in 1798, setting aside five million acres for the investors and establishing a federal
commission, which finally settled the conflicting land claims in 1814 . See id. at 224 .
96 . Fletcher, 10 U .S at 146 (Johnson, J, dissenting in part, concurring in part). Justice
Johnson disputed Marshall's notion that recognizing a fee simple in the state was compatible with
Indian title because Johnson believed that fee simple was an exclusive concept . Id, at 146-147 .
97 . hL at 147.

2004]

Retracing the Discovery Doctrine

729

purchase, when the [present interest holder] should be pleased to sell ."98
Justice Johnson was surely more accurate in his assessment of the state's
interest than Chief Justice Marshall : the state's interest was not possessory
and, at most the state only retained the opportunity that it might become
possessory at some point in the future ."' As discussed below, this sort of
future interest is properly classified as a right of preemption,loo meaning
that, as Justice Johnson indicated, the Indians would hold the fee l01
Perhaps Chief Justice Marshall was unwilling to concede that the
Indians held a fee simple in their lands because, like Justice Johnson, he
assumed that a fee simple was exclusive ownership, which could not be
burdened with a future interest . 102 Under this assumption, if the Indians
held a fee, the Georgia legislature's grant to the land companies would have
been null-and-void, there would have been no property interest conveyed
by Peck to Fletcher, and therefore no vested contract rights to uphold under
the Constitution's Contract Clause . 103 In short, this celebrated case, with all
the headline issues, would simply disappear if Georgia had no right in the
initial legislation to convey any interest in Indian title lands to land
speculators. Thus, the campaign to unseat the corrupted leglislators and the
ensuing statute rescinding the give-away would have been unnecessary.
Perhaps Marshall was unwilling to rule, fifteen years after the fact, that this
longstanding controversy was much ado about nothing, due to the nature of
Indian title.
The assumption of exclusivity of fee titles apparently led Marshall and
the Court to declare that Georgia actually held the fee to Indian lands,
despite its utter lack of possessory rights, which were actually held by the
104
The conceptual
Indians, and which Marshall ruled were owed protection .
incoherence of this approach caused Marshall to characterize the Indian
property interest as being part of a separate tenurial system, wholly outside

98. Id .
99 . See Henderson, supra note 10, at 84-87 (discussing Justice Johnson's partial dissent).
100 . See infra notes 108-09, 18384 and accompanying text .
101_ See supra note 96 and accompanying text . Justice Johnson did not recognize any property
interest in the state or its grantees in the contested lands because he apparently thought that fees could
not be deteasible in favor of parties other than the grantor. See Fletcher, 10 U .S . at 147 (Johnson, J .,
dissenting in part, concurring in part) ("A fee-simple estate may be held in reversion, but our law will
not admit the idea of its being limited after a fee-simple .") . However, the state's interest could have
been conceptualized as an executory interest. See infra note 162 and accompanying text.
102 . See supra notes 96, 101 .
103 . U.S . Const . art. 1, § 10, cl . 1 .
104 . See supra text accompanying note 93 .
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the Anglo-American concept of fee simple ownership. )o5 This duality
enabled the Court to reach the constitutional issues in the case, but it also
allowed subsequent courts to lose sight of the fact that holders of Indian
title possessed nearly all the sticks in the property bundle of rights that fee
simple owners held . lob The consequences ultimately were tragic-a century
and a half later, the Supreme Court held that because Indian title was a
property interest outside the Anglo-American system, Congress could
terminate Indian title without paying just compensation . 107 However, the
underlying assumption of exclusivity of fee simple ownership was false:
fees can in fact be burdened with future conditions, which can cut short
their otherwise infinite length and make future interests possessory . l°8
109
They can also be subject to rights of preemption, or exclusive purchase,
which is surely a better characterization of the government's interest in
Indian title lands than the undefined, judicially malleable concept of Indian
title that the Court created in the wake of the Fletcher decision. Although
the long-term confusion over the nature of Indian title set in motion by
Fletcher was regrettable, the decision did establish that there was such a
property right as Indian title, and that this right could coexist with the
state's proprietary interest, regardless of how each interest was ultimately
defined.
105 . See Henderson, supra note 10, at 85 (noting that Marshall's opinion recognized that Indian
title was a distinct tenurial system from the Anglo-American system, rejecting the "unitarian doctrine"
espoused by Justice Johnson's dissent) .
106 . The only stick in the bundle of property rights the Indian title holders lack is the right of
free alienation, but even that was not entirely clear at the time Fletcher was decided . See infra Part III
(discussing the Johnson case) .
107 . Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v . United States, 348 U.S . 272, 279 (1955);see also supra note 15 and
infra notes 172, 185, 300 and accompanying text.
108. For example, defeasible fees are subject to possibilities of reverter or rights of entry in
grantors, or executory interests in third parties . RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY : INTRODUCTION
FREEHOLD INTERESTS §§ 16, 23-25 (1936) ; RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY: FUTURE INTERESTS PARTS
I& 2 §§ 154-55, 158 (1936); POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY §§ 13 .02, 13 .05, 20.02 to -.03, 20 .05
(Michael Allan Wolf ed ., 2003). These particular fees are created by grantors, and the grantors of the
Indians are not evident from the facts. A better characterization of Indian title would be a fee simple
subject to an exclusive right of preemption . See Henderson, supra note 10, at 86-87 ; W ilkins, supra
note 12, at 283, 302 . But even Justice Johnson, who characterized the state's interest in Fletcher as a
future interest, .supra note 98 and accompanying text, did not see a right of preemption as consistent
with a fee simple interest on the part of the Indians . See supra note 101 .
109 . See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 4.4 (1983) (defining
a preemptive provision as an interest subject to right of first refusal) . The government's right of
preemption imposed a disabling restraint on the Indians' right to alienate. The common law approved
such restraints "if, under all the circumstances of the case and considering the purpose, nature, and
duration of the restraint, the legal policy favoring freedom of alienation does not reasonably apply ." ld.
§ 4 .1(2). The national security reason for the government's right of preemption, see infra text
accompanying and following note 203, certainly would support enforcement of the disabling restraint on
alienation imposed on Indian title .
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OF THE DISCOVERY DOCTRINE : JOHNSON V.
M'INTOSH

In 1773, William Murray, an Indian trader and frontier land speculator,
challenged British authority to enforce the Proclamation of 1763'5 ban on
110 He argued to a local British commander
land purchases from Indians .
that an opinion of the Attorney General and the Solicitor General supported
his claim that he had a natural right to purchase Indian land, and the Indians
had a natural right to sell . ]]] Although the local British commander at
Kaskaskia (in what is now southern Illinios) was unimpressed with the legal
opinion and warned Murray against purchasing land from Indians, Murray
12
proceeded to negotiate with them anyway.' The Illinois tribes with whom
he dealt were receptive, having experienced a dramatic decline in their
numbers due to European diseases and inter-tribal warfare ." 3 Murray
eventually purchased two strategically located tracts of land for his Illinois
Company, one at the intersection of the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers and
the other at the intersection of the Illinois and Mississippi Rivers, for a total
of $24,000 worth of cloth, blankets, gunpowder, lead, gun flints, flour,
115
horses, and cattle . 114 The transaction took place in July 1773 .

110. WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 288 .

I11 . Id. For an explanation of the legal opinion on which Murray relied, see supra note 63 .
Murray was an agent for the Illinois Company, a company organized by a group of Philadelphia
merchants . See Eric Kades, History and Interpretation of the Great Case of Johnson v . M'Intosh, 19
LAW & HIST . REv. 67, 81 (2001) [hereinafter Kades, History] (containing the most detailed explanation
of the land transactions that led to the litigation in Johnson v . M'Intosh.) In the citations below, I rely
heavily on Professor Kades' original research for the facts of the purchases at issue in the case, although
I disagree with his characterization of the property interests that were purchased by the speculators and
retained by the Indian tribes and the motivation he attributes to Justice Marshall in deciding the Johnson
case_ Compare id. (quoting Johnson, 21 U .S . at 574, for the proposition that purchasers of Indian lands
were only subject to the "Indian right of occupancy"), with text accompanying infra notes 183, 216
(stating that the best characterization of the Indians' property interest is a fee simple subject to the
government's right of preemption) .
112 . Kades, History, supra note t 11, at 81 .
113 . Id. at 82 (explaining that the population of the Illinois tribes declined from "12,000 in 1680
to 1,720 in 1756, to [just] 500 in 1800") .
114 . Id (noting that the company originally valued these goods at $37,000, but in the Johnson
litigation stipulated their value at $24,000) . Professor Kades supplies a useful map of the purchased
lands in his article . See id, at 68 .
115 . Id. at 82 . Professor Kades explains that, perhaps due to doubts about whether Murray had
the authority to purchase land from the Indians, the deed contained an alternative conveyance to the
King of England for the benefit of the Illinois Company. Id. These doubts were well-founded, as a
year-and-a-half after the conveyance, the British commander at Kaskaskia declared that the purchases
were invalid, Id. at 83 .
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After the initial purchase, the Illinois Company began to lobby for
legislative ratification of the transaction. 116 After getting little support in
Pennsylvania, the home state of most of the company's principals, 117 the
company turned to the royal governor of Virginia, which claimed
jurisdiction over Illinois under its royal charter.118 To persuade the
governor, the Company offered him stock in a new land speculation
company, the Wabash Company, if he would support the Illinois
Company's claim.119 Murray then proceeded to recruit a prominent French
fur trader, Louis Viviat, to negotiate the Wabash Company's land purchase
from the Piankashaw tribe, which he did in October 1775 .12° These lands
consisted of two large tracts bordering on the Wabash River along what is
now the Indiana-Illinois border . 121
In the years following these transactions, the two companies merged
and recruited well-connected investors, such as James Wilson and Robert
Morris, to lobby for legislative ratification of their purchases."' These
efforts met with frustration. The Virginia legislature enacted a statute
outlawing purchases from Indians in 1779, and then ceded to the federal
government its western land claims, including those in what later became
123
The companies fared no better
the States of Illinois and Indiana, in 1783
116. The Supreme Court would eventually ratify congressional ratifications of prior purchases
of Indian title in Machel v. United States, 34 U.S . (9 Pet.) 711, 762-63 (1835). See also infra note 284
and accompanying text .
117. See supra note I I l .
It 8. Kades, History, supra note 111, at 83 .
119. Id. at 83-84. The governor, Lord Dunmore, was thus able to deny any connection to the
Illinois Company in supporting the company's claim to the British Secretary of State, while also not
mentioning his involvement in the new Wabash Company's efforts to purchase other Indian lands. Id.
120. Id. at 84 (noting that, like the Illinois, the Piankashaws, one of the six tribes of Miami
Indians, had suffered severe population declines in the century before the transaction) . Murray might
have chosen Viviat to negotiate the Piankashaw purchase because he was French, and the French
almost alone among European colonizers-had recognized at least some private purchases of Indian
lands. Id. at 71 . A failure to recognize the purchase might be seen by the French as a threat to other
land titles, which the English presumably did not want to threaten . Id. at 84 .
121 . For a map depicting the geographic relationships, see id. at 68 . Like the 1773 purchase, the
1775 purchase contained an alternative grant to the King . Id. at 85 . While reserving to itself the land
between the two tracts, the tribe granted the Wabash Company a navigational easement on the Wabash
River and tributaries. Id. at 84 . The consideration paid by the Wabash Company was in the same sorts
of goods paid by the Illinois Company, although slightly greater in value. Id. at 84-85 (noting that the
company's original estimate was $42,000, later stipulated to be $31,000)_
122. Wilson, later a drafter of the Constitution and a Supreme Court Justice, became Chairman
of the United Illinois and Wabash Land Companies in 1779. Id. at 85 . Morris was the principal
financier of the Revolutionary War. Id. at 85-86.
123. Id at 86-87 (noting that the Virginia statute was an effort to "restate the ancient rule
against direct purchases from the Indians" and that in the cession of western lands "there was a tacit
understanding" between the state and the federal government that the latter would reject land claims
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before Congress, despite at least five memorials drafted by Wilson between
1781 and 1796, which invoked the "universal natural rights" of Indian
tribes to sell land and speculators to purchase it, and included promises to
cede a portion of the lands to the federal government .l2' Despite repeated
efforts, the last of which occurred in 1816, the companies were unable to
125
secure congressional ratification of their purchases.
Meanwhile, in 1803, the federal government, largely through the
efforts of General William Henry Harrison, began to negotiate treaties
under which Indians on the Illinios-Indiana frontier would cede land in
126
Land surveys began
exchange for consideration and federal protection .
in 1804 ; Congress passed a preemption statute in 1814 ; and President
Madison opened the market to land sales in 1816 .12 ' The year before the
land sales began, William McIntosh, a Vincennes lawyer, who became the
defendant in the Supreme Court case Johnson v. M'Intosh 128 and who
represented preemptioners and French colonial claimants, filed a claim for a
considerable amount of land-nearly 12,000 acres in 53 separate tracts129
probably obtained in exchange for legal services provided to his clients .
Four years later, in 1819, Thomas Johnson, one of the original
investors in the Wabash Company, died, naming his son and grandson,
Joshua Johnson and Thomas Graham, as the primary beneficiaries of his
will, and Robert Goodloe Harper, a famous Supreme Court litigator and
130
Harper
fellow investor in the joint companies, as his executor .

based on Indian purchases); see Johnson v . M'Intosh, 21 U.S . (8 Wheat) 543, 559-60 (1823)
(discussing Virginia's 1783 western land cession to the federal government) .
124 . Kades, History, supra. note 111, at 87, 89 . The company argued that by accepting its offer
of a land cession, Congress could avoid the prospect of the Indians obtaining a windfall by being paid
twice for the lards . Id. at 89 .
125 . See id at 92-93 .
126 . Id. at 93-94 .
127 . Id. at 95-96 . Preemption statutes gave squatters and others who improved lands the
exclusive right to purchase lands at statutory prices (52,00 an acre in the case of the lands at issue), but
limited the amount that could be purchased to 160 acres . Id. at 96 . See generally GEORGE CAMERON
COGGINS ET AL, FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW 75-76 (5th ed. 2002) (noting that
Congress enacted twenty-four special preemption statutes, covering specific geographic areas, between
1790 and 1820 and that it did not enact a permanent generic statute authorizing both prospective and
retroactive preemption until 1841).
128 . The court reporter apparently misspelled William McIntosh's name .
129. Kades, History, supra note 111, at 97-98 (considering, but discounting, the possibility that
McIntosh engaged in massive land fraud in collusion with the Kaskaskia land office); Johnson v .
M'Imosh, 21 U .S, (8 Wheat) 543 (1823) .
130 . Kades, History, supra note l It, at 99 (noting that Thomas Johnson had been the first
governor of the State of Maryland and a Supreme Court justice in 1791-92) . turper, who had
successfully argued for the land speculators in Fletcher v, Peck, 10 U .S . (6 Crunch) 87, 139 (1810)
(holding that the Contract Clause barred the Georgia legislature from rescinding fraudulent grants ; see
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apparently saw the will as an opportunity to litigate the companies' claim,
131 However, as Professor
which had fallen on deaf congressional ears.
Kades has shown, there was no actual case or controversy to litigate an
ejectment cause of action, since the Wabash Company land claims inherited
by Johnson and Graham were at least fifty miles from the closest McIntosh
holding. 132 The collusive nature o£ the suit is evidenced by the fact that the
defendant stipulated to the erroneous facts, waived his right to force the
plaintiffs to post an appeal bond after they lost before the federal district
court in Illinois, and consented to the writ of error the plaintiffs filed in the
133 The evidence overwhelmingly supports the
Supreme Court in 1822 .
conclusion that both parties wanted the Supreme Court to review and
finally settle the land claims that Congress had consistently rejected for a
quarter-century. 134
In Johnson, the nature of Indian title and the state's concurrent interest
were more squarely at issue than in Fletcher v. Peck, although again no
tribes or individual Indians were before the Court. Johnson and Graham,
the Wabash Company shareholders, were represented not only by Harper,
but also by Daniel Webster . They argued that the Royal Proclamation of
1763 could not deprive the Indians of their natural law right to sell their
lands, either because the Indians were not British subjects governed by the
proclamation, or because the proclamation was a legislative act requiring
the consent of Parliament. 135 They also maintained that a 1779 Virginia
statute that prohibited private purchases of Indian lands could not,
consistent with the Virginia constitution, take away the private, vested

supra Part II), had submitted a memorial on the companies behalf to Congress in 1810, shortly after he
became an investor . Kades, History, supra note 111, at 92 & n .48 .
131 . Kades, History, supra note 111, at 99.
132 . Professor Kades suggested that Johnson and Graham's problems had to do with the fact
that they inherited stock in the Wabash Company, but the only tract of land owned by McIntosh which
conflicted with the joint companies' claims concerned land claimed by the Illinois Company . Id. at 99
100 . Despite the merger of the two companies, they failed to execute deeds conveying mutual
ownership interests to each other. Therefore, Johnson and Graham would have lacked standing to sue
on the conflict between McIntosh and the Illinois Company claim . Id.
133 . Id, at 100-02 (explaining that the requirements of an ejectment cause of action necessitated
the creation by the plaintiffs of a fictitious lessee) .
134 . See Johnson, 21 U .S . at 562 (noting that the joint companies began petitioning Congress in
1791 and continued until 1816) .
135 . Johnson, 21 U .S. at 563-64 . The precursors of Johnson were traced by Henderson, supra
note 10, at 96-101 . In his article, J . Youngblood Henderson noted, inter alia, the significance of an
1821 Attorney General's opinion that the Johnson opinion seemed to adopt without attribution
concerning the distinct land tenure systems between the Indians and the settlers . Id. at 96 (quoting 1 Up .
At'y Gen . 466-67 (1821)).
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property rights they possessed as shareholders of the Wabash Company. 136
And, further, they contended that a similar colonial statute, enacted in 1662,
had either lapsed or been repealed. 137
On the other hand, McIntosh, whose title to the land was based on a
conveyance of a federal patent, claimed that the Indians lacked any natural
rights to the land because they were not "independent communities, having
a permanent property in the soil, capable of alienation to private
individuals," but were instead "in a state of nature, and have never been
admitted into the general society of nations."138 McIntosh claimed that
international law had "uniformly disregarded their supposed right" to land
title, and that "[d]iscovery is the foundation of title, [which] overlooks all
139 Even if international law considered
proprietary rights in the natives ."
the Indian tribes to be an independent foreign state (which McIntosh did not
concede), Johnson and Graham, as grantees of the Indians, would have only
140
a title recognized by Indian law, which did not include fee title.
McIntosh also alleged that the 1662 Virginia colonial statute forbidding
private Indian land purchases had never been repealed, and the 1779 statute
was merely a recodiflcation of "what had always been regarded as the
settled law," which held that Indian title to land was "a mere right of
usufruct and habitation, without power of alienation ."141 According to this
view, the law of nature, which measured property rights "by the extent of
men's wants, and their capacity of using [land] to supply them," denied that
Indians possessed any "proprietary interest in the vast tracts of territory
which they wandered over" 142 McIntosh further maintained that under the

136 . Johnson, 21 U .S . at 565 . Johnson and Graham also argued that the 1779 act was
subsequently repealed by a statutory revision in 1794. Id. at 565-66.
137 . Kades, History, supra note Ill, at 103 . This argument is not contained in the case
summary prepared by the Court reporter, Henry Wheaton . Wheaton, the Court's third reporter (181627), has been called the ablest of the Court's reporters . OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES 926 (Kermit L . Hall ed ., 1992) .
138 . Johnson, 21 U .S. at 567 . In Johnson, Chief Justice Marshall went on to note :
According to every theory of property, the Indians had no individual rights to
land ; nor had they any collectively, or in their national capacity ; for the lands
occupied by each tribe were not used by them in such a manner as to prevent their
being appropriated by a people of cultivators .
Id. at 570 .
139 . Id. at 567 .
140. Id. at 568 ("The law of every dominion affects all persons and property situate within it ;
and the Indians never had any idea of individual property in lands .")
141 . Id. at 569.
142 . Id. at569-70 .
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"First principle in colonial law . . . all titles must be derived from the
crown." 143
Chief Justice Marshall, writing for a unanimous Court, accepted
neither the plaintiffs' nor the defendant's arguments. He perceived the
issue of the case to be a narrow one: whether the Indians had the authority
to sell land to private individuals. 144 To resolve this question, he refused to
look exclusively at natural law "principles of abstract justice," which
governed the rights of the inhabitants of civilized nations."' Nor would he
decide "whether agriculturists, merchants, and manufacturers, have a right,
on abstract principles, to expel hunters from the territory they possess." 146
Instead, he concluded that the case turned on "principles . . . which our own
government has adopted in the particular case, and given us as the rule for
147 In short, Justice Marshall ignored principles of natural law
our decision .
and based his decision on what he perceived to be the prevailing practice
with respect to Indian land rights 148 -what he termed "the actual state of
things ."149
Marshall agreed with McIntosh that the prevailing practice was
grounded in the doctrine of discovery, but he did not agree that this doctrine
recognized no native land rights ."' He also agreed with McIntosh that the
1779 Virginia statute was simply a codification of the pre-exisiting
143 . Id at 570. The notion that all valid land grants had to trace their origin to a royal grant was
a product of feudal thinking, which replaced the earlier common law notion-grounded on Roman ideas
of natural law-that simple possession was the basis of title . In the words of one commentator, this
transformation was based on "tortuous logic." Bennett, supra note 37, at 619 .
144, Johnson, 21 U .S . at 572 ("The inquiry, therefore, is, in a great measure, confined to the
power of Indians to give, and of private individuals to receive, a title which can be sustained in the
Courts of this country .") .
145 . Id.
146 . Id. at 588 .
147 . Id. at 572 .
148 . Here, I agree with Professor Kades, although I believe that what Marshall thought he was
doing was interpreting the common law doctrine of discovery, not endorsing the concept of statutory
custom. Kades, History, supra note 111, at 107-10 . However, certainly the common law principle he
was pronouncing was influenced by, and consistent with, a long history of statutory restrictions on
private purchases of Indian title .
149. Johnson, 21 U .S, at 591 (noting that the discovery doctrine, as interpreted by the Court,
was "adapted to the actual state of things") ; see infra text accompanying note 175 (noting that the
restraint on alienation imposed on Indian title was "adapted to the actual condition" of the Indians and
the colonizers) ; see also infra note 252 (referring to the federal Airy of protection due to the "actual state
of things") . Professor Frickey has suggested that "[clolonialism, Johnson seemed to say, raises almost
exclusively nonjusticiable, normative questions beyond judicial authority and competence ." Frickey,
Marshalling, supra note 25, at 389 (emphasis removed) .
150 . Compare supra notes 138-139 and accompanying text (noting McIntosh's argument
concerning the natives' lack of proprietary rights), with Johnson, 21 U .S . at 574 (explaining that natives'
rights were not entirely disregarded, bit rather, impaired by discovery).
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discovery rule, and therefore the statute took no vested property rights ."'
Johnson and Graham's contention that the Royal Proclamation was
ineffective or unlawful was rejected; Marshall upheld the ban on private
purchases of Indian lands in the West. 112 The Chief Justice also endorsed
Mcintosh's view that whatever rights Johnson and Graham obtained from
the Indians were perhaps protected by Indian law, but those rights were not
cognizable in the "Courts of the United States!"" The result validated
McIntosh's claim that all freely alienable titles originated in the
government . 154
The heart of the opinion concerned the Chief Justice's interpretation of
the discovery doctrine . According to Marshall, discovery gave the
discovering nation land "title," which "might be consummated by
151
possession ." 155 What he meant by "title," however, is hardly clear.
Discovery operated to allocate rights among discoverers by giving the first
discovering European nation the right to exclude other European nations.
Marshall claimed that all the European powers agreed to this principle.157

151 . See supra note 141 and accompanying text .
152 . Johnson, 21 U .S . at 594 ("The proclamation issued by the King of Great Britain, in 1763,
has been considered, and, we think, with reason, as constituting an additional objection to the title of the
plaintiffs .") ; see also id, at 597 (noting that "[t]he authority of this proclamation, so far as it respected
this continent, has never been denied, and the titles it gave to lands have always been sustained in our
Courts," and limiting the holding in Campbell v_ Hall, 98 Eng . Rep_ 1045 (1774), which Johnson and
Graham argued recognized private land purchases from natives of the East Indies) .
153 . Johnson, 21 U.S . at 593 . Private purchasers of Indian lands have
a title dependent on [Indian] laws. . . . Courts of the United States cannot
interpose for the protection of [Indian] title . The person who purchases lands
from the Indians . . . holds their title under their protection, and subject to their
laws . If [the Indians] annul the grant, we know of no tribunal which can revise
and set aside the proceeding.
id. ; see also id. at 589 ("It is not for the Courts of this country to question the validity of [governmentderived] title, or to sustain one which is incompatible with it") .
154, See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
155 . Johnson, 21 U .S . at 573 .
156 . Later, in Worcester, discussed infra Part IV, Marshall would state that the only title that the
King of England's colonial charters could convey was "the exclusive right of purchasing such lands as
the natives were willing to sell ." Worcester v . Georgia, 31 U .S . (6 Pet.) 515, 545 (1832) .
157 . Johnson, 21 U .S . at573 .
[A]s [the European nations] were all in pursuit of nearly the same object, it was
necessary, in order to avoid conflicting settlements, and consequent war with each
other, to establish a principle, which all should acknowledge as the law by which
the right of acquisition, which they all asserted, should be regulated as between
themselves . This principle was, that discovery gave title to the government by
whose subjects, or by whose authority, it was made, against all other European
governments . . . .
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This exclusionary right ran only against other European discoverers and did
not equip discoverers to oust the natives.
On the contrary, Marshall claimed that under the discovery doctrine, all
European nations, including the British and their successors in the United
States, "respected the right of the natives, as occupants," but "asserted the
ultimate dominion" over Indian Iands .158 This meant that the United States
159
had the "power to grant the soil, while yet in possession of the natives,"
as Georgia had done in Fletcher v. Peck lb° The effect of such a
conveyance gave "a title to the grantees, subject only to the Indian right of
occupancy." 161
Here is where the Chief Justice confused his property concepts .
Federal grantees of Indian title lands received only a future interest, which
would not become possessory until the federal government exercised its
right of preemption. Such an interest is commonly known as an executory
interest. 162 According to the Restatement of Property, "exeeutory interests
vest an estate in the holder of the interest [e .g., the federal grantees] upon
the happening of a condition or event [e.g., exercise of preemption] . Until
163 This is a kind of
such happening, they are non-vested future interests."
"title," but it is hardly a fee simple title . Similarly, the "paramount title"
that Marshall claimed the Europeans acquired was a future interest, an
inchoate title that required other action to be perfected. In short, the
discovery doctrine created a kind of split estate, leaving the Indians with a
present estate that Marshall called occupancy title and giving the discoverer
164
a future interest: a right of preemption in Indian lands.
The discovery doctrine, which Marshall at one point labeled an
"extravagant and absurd idea," diminished, but did not disregard the
natives' natural law rights . 165 They lost the right to freely alienate their
lands and also the right to govern themselves as independent nations. As
Marshall explained:
158 . Id, at 574 .
159. Id.
160 . Fletcher v . Peck, 10 U .S, (6 Craneh) 87, 88 (1810).
161 . Johnson, 21 U,S . at 574. Marshall maintained that Spain, France, Portugal, Holland, and
England all based their territorial claims in the New World on the discovery doctrine . Id. at 574-79 .
But see infra note 198 and accompanying text, indicating that the discovery doctrine was no longer
being used contemporaneously with the Johnson decision.
162 . See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY : FUTURE INTERESTS PARTS I & 2, supra note 108, § 158 ;
PO W ELL ON REAL PROPERTY, Supra note 108, § 20 .05 .
163 . POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, Supra note 108, § 20,05[2] .
164 . Johnson, 21 U .S . at 592 ("The absolute ultimate title has been considered as acquired by
discovery, subject only to the Indian title of occupancy, which title the discoverers possessed the
exclusive right of xquiring") .
165 . Worcester v . Georgia, 31 U,S . (6 Pet.) 515, 544 (1832) .

Retracing the Discovery Doctrine

2004]

73 9

[T]he rights of the original inhabitants were, in no instance,
entirely disregarded ; but were necessarily, to a considerable
extent, impaired . . . . [T]heir rights to complete sovereignty, as
independent nations, were necessarily diminished, and their
power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to whomsoever
they pleased, was denied by the original fundamental principle,
that discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it. 166
Thus, the discovery doctrine imposed a restraint on the Indians' right to
convey their lands and some largely undefined restrictions on their ability
to govern . The latter would not be clarified until the Cherokee cases,
discussed below. 167 But the scope of the former-a restraint on the Indians'
right to convey their lands-was critical to the outcome in Johnson .
The determination that the discovery doctrine imposed a restraint on
the Indians' rights of alienation led the Court to rule against Johnson and
Graham, as the Court concluded that the Indians could not convey a fee
simple title to the Wabash Company. 168 Indian title was technically
alienable, but only to the government, which alone could extinguish Indian
title. 161 Consequently, all the Wabash Company obtained from the chiefs
was what Marshall termed their right of occupancy, which was terminable
by the subsequent conveyance from the chiefs to the government ."'
Marshall's labeling of the Indians' proprietary interest as "occupancy"
title turned out to be a tragic choice of words. 171 Subsequent Supreme
Courts have relied on this characterization to marginalize native property

166.
167.
168.
169.

Johnson, 21 U.S . at 574,
See infra Part IV.
Johnson, 21 U.S, at 591.

Marshall indicated that the natives were "incapable of transferring the absolute title to
others ." Id. He did suggest, however, that the Indians had the authority to transfer their possessory
interest by sale to non-Indians . Id. at 593 ("The person who purchases lands from Indians, within their
territory, incorporates himself with them, so far as respects the property purchased ; holds their title
under their protection, and subject to their laws .") . Professor Ball has noted that this means that Indian
title is in fact alienable, although not very valuable . Ball, Constitution, supra note 10, at 25-26. Under
this view, what the Wabash Company obtained was whatever property interest trbal law recognized .
170, When the treaty between the United States and the tribe extinguished the company's rights
through a land cession from the tribe to the federal government, the only remedy the company's
shareholders had was under tribal law, since under U .S . law those rights were validly extinguished as a
result of the cession. In Johnson, Marshall acknowledged that the Indians "had an unquestionable right
to annul any grant they had made to American citizens ." Johnson, 21 U.S . at 594. This seems to be
what they did by subsequently ceding the land to the United States .
171 . See id at 563 (noting that the tribes' "title by occupancy is to be respected"), 574 ("These
grants have been understood by all, to convey a title to the grantees, subject only to the Indian right of
occupancy .") .
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rights,' 12 where, in fact, his opinion was quite protective of their property
rights . The only stick in the property bundle of rights they lost as a result of
the decision was the right of free alienation. They retained all of the other
sticks . Marshall clearly stated that they retained full rights of possession
and use, 173 and he indicated that their possession could defeat an action in
ejectment. 174 Nothing in the decision indicated that the tribes would not
retain development rights as well. The loss of the right of free alienation
was, in Marshall's words, "indispensable to that system [of land titles]
under which the country has been settled, and . . . adapted to the actual
condition of the two people[s] ."175 The reason why the restraint on Indian
alienation was "indispensable" had to do with concerns over national
security : the government's right of preemption was necessary to prevent the
Indians from selling their land to citizens of hostile countries, a
considerable concern along the North American frontier when the British
Crown promulgated the Royal Proclamation in 1763, which the Johnson
decision upheld .176 As a subsequent Supreme Court interpreted the Johnson
decision, the right of free alienation "was inherently lost to the overriding
sovereignty of the United States" 177 In short, the sovereignty interest that
caused the loss of the right of free alienation was in fact a national security
concern.
The nature of the retained Indian proprietary interest under the
discovery doctrine has been misunderstood over the years. The language of
the opinion repeatedly referred to the retained native proprietary rights as
mere "occupancy," 178 and the pronouncement that the government
179
possessed "ultimate title" or "seisin in fee," is at odds with the actual
proprietary interests held by the Indians and the government. The Indians
retained full present rights of possession, use, and development, while
being burdened with a partial restraint on alienation. l80 True, the restraint
on alienation was rather severe, allowing the natives to sell alienable title
172 . See, e.g., Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v_ United States, 348 U.S . 272, 285 (1955) (citing Johnson
to conclude that "the taking by the United States of unrecognized Indian title is not compensable under
the Fifth Amendmenf').
173 . Johnson, 21 U .S . at 574 C'[The Indians] were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the
soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it, and to use it according to their own
discretion .") .
174 . Id. at 592; see also id at 591 (noting that the government owes holders of Indian title
protection of the possession of their lands) .
175 . Id at 591-92.
176, Id. a t 594-97 .
177 . Oliphant v . Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U .S . 191, 209 (1978) .
178 . Johnson, 21 U .S . at 574, 585, 587, 591-92 .
179 . Id. at 574 ("ultimate dominion"), 592 (`seisin in fee"), 603 ("ultimate title").
180 . See text accompanying supra notes 172-77 .
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only to the federal government . But the government (and its grantees) had
only a right of preemption, a mere future interest, and it owed the Indians a
duty of protection concerning their present interest."' Therefore, referring
to the government's interest as "seisin in fee" was hardly consistent with
Chief Justice Marshall's professed attachment to the "actual state of
things," at least in terms of the actual sticks in the property bundle of rights
held by the Indians and the govemment.l82 A better description would have
been to label the Indians' property interest as a fee simple subject to the
government's right of preemption . 183 Such fees long have been recognized
in Anglo-American law. 184 Unfortunately, Marshall did not describe the
native proprietary interest in these terms. Had he done so, the worst
interpretations of the Johnson opinion might have been avoided ."'

181 . Fletcher v . Peck 10 U .S . (6 Crunch) 87, 124 (1810).
182 . Marshall analogized the Indian occupancy interest to a "lease for years," Johnson, 21 U.S .
at 592, but terms for years require a grant from a landlord to the tenant for a fixed or computable period
of time . See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY : LANDLORD AND TENANT § 1 .4 (1977) (stating
that "to] landlord-tenant relationship may be created to endure for any fixed or computable period of
time.")_ There of course was no grant attendant to discovery and no fixed or computable period of time
by which the government had to exercise its right of preemption . In tact, the government did not do so
in some cases until a century and a half after the Johnson opinion . See, e .g., Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act of 1971, Pub. L . No, 92-203, §§ 2(a), 4(a), 85 Star. 688, 688-89 (codified as amended at
43 U.S .C. §§ 1601-1629h (2000)) (stating that there "is an immediate need for a fair and just settlement
of all claims by Natives and Native groups of Alaska")
183 . Professor Wilkins largely agrees, although he does not clearly acknowledge the severe
restraint on alienation imposed on this fee . Wilkins, supra note 12, at 314 ("[I]f Indians held their lands
with a sacred title, comparable to fee-simple, then they must also possess the power to sell those
lands .") . In maintaining the position that Indian title was a fee simple with a partial restraint on
alienation and subject to the government's exclusive preemptory right, 1 disagree with most other
commentators, such as Professor Kades, who describes the right of government purchasers of lands in
Indian possession as being "`subject only to the Indian right of occupancy,' but otherwise . . . a full fee
interest" Kades, History, supra note 111, at 75 (quoting Johnson, 21 U .S . at 574); see also the
disagreement with my casebook co-author concerning the characterization of Indian title . JUDITH V .
ROYSTER & MICHAEL C . BLUMM, NATIVE AMERICAN NATURAL RESOURCES LAW : TEACHER'S
MANUAL 42 (2002) (Royster maintaining thatJohnson established "a form of `title' in the United States,
leaving the tribes with something less ."). A property title without rights of possession, use, and
development until the government acts on its right of preemption is a future interest, not a present
interest . Not qualifying the non-Indian property interest in this manner seems to encourage the kind of
misunderstandings or misrepresentations that produced the unfortunate results in later cases . See cases
cited supra notes 15-16.
184 . See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
185 . See, e .g., Milner S . Ball, John Marshall and Indian Nations in the Beginning and Now, 33
J . MARSHALL L . REV . 1183, 1189-90 (2000) (professing astonishment at the way Johnson was
interpreted by subsequent Supreme Courts in Tee-flit-Ton Indians v . United States, 348 U .S. 272
(1955), and Oliphant v . Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U .S . 191 (1978), and referring to the Court's
interpretations as "performative utterance'') ; Ball, Constitution, supra note 10, at 25-26 (criticizing
subsequent interpretations of Johnson ) ; Nell Jessup Newton, At the Whim of the Sovereign: Aboriginal
Title Reconsidered, 31 HASTINas L.J . 1215, 1244 (1980) [hereinafter Newton, Whim of the Sovereign]
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Marshall looked to the practice of colonial charters and prior treaties to
conclude that the exclusive power to extinguish Indian title lay "in that
116
Citing the 1779
government which might constitutionally exercise it."
Virginia statute, which asserted that the state possessed an "exclusive right
of pre-emption" of Indian title within the lands described in the state's
charter, Marshall declared that this legislation was just evidence "of the
broad principle which had always been maintained, that the exclusive right
187 Thus, even
to purchase from the Indians resided in the government."
though the conveyances at issue in Johnson antedated the statute, there was
no taking of any of Johnson and Graham's property rights : Marshall would
not attribute to the Virginia statute "the power of annulling vested
rights ."' 88
Chief Justice Marshall made no mention of the Indian Commerce
Clause, which authorized federal control of Indian affairs in 1787,189 or the
Trade and Intercourse Act, which federalized Indian affairs in 1790 ."'
Since the land purchases at issue took place long before either the
Constitution or the statute, neither would necessarily govern those
purchases.l91 However, Marshall construed the common law to produce the
same result that the application of those provisions would have achieved if
they had applied. Like the Virginia statute, they apparently merely codified
pre-existing common law, which was that only the government could
extinguish Indian title. Marshall did not clearly resolve, at least not in this
case, which government possessed the extinguishment authority, the federal
government or the states . He merely stated that "either the United States, or
the several States . . . [had] the exclusive power to extinguish [Indian
192
title] ." The lands at issue in the case were part of Virginia's western land
claims, which it ceded to the United States in 1783 and, at least for these
lands, the Chief Justice concluded that "the exclusive right of the United
States to extinguish [Indian] title and, to grant the soil, has never, we
believe, been doubted. "193 Whether that federal power would extend to
lands within recognized state boundaries was left for another case to decide .
(asserting that "ltlhe only sovereign act that can be said to have conquered the Alaska native was the
Tee-Itit-Ton opinion itself').
186. Johnson, 21 U .S . at 585.
187. Id.
188. Id. All Johnson and Graham acquired were proprietary rights cognizable in Indian courts,
of which there were none at the time, See supra notes 153, 169-70 and accompanying text.
189. U.S, CONST, art. 1, § 8, cl . 3.
190. Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat . 137 (codified as amended at 25 U.S .C . §
177 (2000)) .
191. Recall that the lands were purchased in October 1773 and 1775 . Johnson, 21 U.S. at 562.
192 . Id. at585.
193 . Id. at586.
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A good deal of criticism of the reasoning of Johnson v. M'Intosh has
concerned Marshall's indication that Indian title could be extinguished
194 Later, he noted that "[c]onquest
"either by purchase or by conquest ."
gives a title which the Courts of the conqueror cannot deny.""' Why Chief
Justice Marshall was moved to include conquest as a means to terminate
Indian title has never been quite clear ; the facts of the case concerned a
private purchase of Indian lands and a treaty ceding those same lands to the
United States . Moreover, the treaty negotiations by which the lands in
question were acquired by the United States expressly repudiated the theory
of conquest . 196 And the reality is that the United States acquired the
overwhelming preponderance of Indian titles by purchase, not conquest.197
Even in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the discovery
doctrine was regarded as "increasingly archaic."198 This ahistorical
suggestion, that conquest could terminate Indian title, might have been
because Marshall wanted to justify his decision not to attempt to use
judicial power to overturn the discovery doctrine, even though he thought
the restriction on the Indians' rights of alienation "may be opposed to
natural right, and to the usages of civilized nations."199 However
inconsistent with natural law, the discovery doctrine could not be
overturned by "the Courts of justice;"20' the doctrine was apparently a non-

194 . Id. at 587 . Professor Williams' critique was particularly vigorous : "The Doctrine of
Discovery was nothing more than the reflection of a set of Eurocentric racist beliefs elevated to the
status of a universal principle--one culture's argument to support its conquest and colonization of a
newly discovered, alien world ." WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 326; see also id. at 317 ("Johnson's
acceptance of the Doctrine of Discovery into United States law preserved the legacy of 1,000 years of
European racism and colonialism directed against non-Westem peoples .") .
195 . Johnson, 21 U .S . at 588 .
196 . See Berman, supra note 24, at 648-49 n .50 (noting that in negotiations with the tribes of
the Northwest in 1793, the United States claimed that the treaty between the King of England and the
United States only conveyed to the latter the right to exclude other nations from purchasing or settling
Indian lands-a right of preemption ; the Indian negotiators, however, denied the existence of such a
right) .
197 . See Cohen, OrigPrttrl Title, supra note 14, at 35-43 (detailing the purchase of over two
million square miles of Indian land by the United States) ; see also Kades, History, supra note 111, at 74
(noting the rare instances of conquest, including the Pequot War (1637) and King Phillip's War (167577) in New England).
198 . See Berman, supra note 24, at 651 (discussing the 1790 Nootka Sound controversy
between England and Spain and the 1826 controversy between the United States and Britain over the
Oregon Territory, in which both countries agreed that discovery alone was insufficient to grant
sovereignty) .
199 . Johnson, 21 U .S, at 591 .
200. Id. at 592.
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justiciable political question . It may have seemed to Marshall that
characterizing the issue in military terms justified judicial acquiescence . 01
There was another reason why the Court decided that the discovery
doctrine was beyond judicial reversal : since settlement, the country's land
conveyance system had assumed that a government grant was a valid
conveyance .212 To rule otherwise in 1823 would have unsettled land titles
throughout the country. Thus, as Marshall sarcastically observed:
However extravagant the pretension of converting the
discovery of an inhabited country into conquest may appear ; if
the principle has been asserted in the first instance, and
afterwards sustained; if a country has been acquired and held
under it; if the property of the great mass of the community
originates in it, it becomes the law of the land, and cannot be
questioned. 203
In other words, for hundreds of years people had relied on government
grants as conveyances of secure title, and it was simply too late in the day
for the Court to unsettle those long-established reliance interests. As a
practical matter, if the Court had ruled that Indian title included all natural
law rights, Congress, which had control over the Court's appellate
docket,204 could have restricted the Court from reviewing cases involving
Indian affairs, or established a special court for such issues . Marshall was
clearly unwilling to place his Court's jurisdiction in that sort of jeopardy .
Perhaps Marshall's realization of the overwhelming practical
difficulties of ruling that the Indians possessed all natural law property
rights accounted for the opinion's tone, which dripped with unmistakable
irony. For example, in referring to the "pompous claims" of the Europeans
to the New World, Marshall noted that "whites were not always the
aggressors ,205 in warfare with the Indians, and mentioned the "extravagant .
. . pretension of converting the discovery of an inhabited country into

201, See to. at 588 (explaining that "[oIonquest gives a title which the Courts of the conqueror
cannot deny") . Marshall emphasized that the British maintained their discovery doctrine claims "as far
west as the river Mississippi, by the sword ." Id He apparently was referring to the French and Indian
War, but that was a war fought over which European nation was entitled to discoverer rights; it was not
a war to terminate Indian title, a fact Marshall seemed to acknowledge. See id. at 583-84 .
202. Id. at 603.
203 . Id. at 591_
204, U.S . CONST. art. 111, § 2, cl . 2 ("[T]he supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both
as to Law and Fact with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make .").
205. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 590.
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conquest "z°6 The sarcasm may have reflected Marshall's personal feelings
about the plight of the Indians, 207 but those feelings were not enough to
persuade him to unsettle reliance on the great majority of land titles, which
could be traced to government grants .
Some of the ambiguities remaining after Johnson v. M'Intosh had to
0s
await clarification in the Cherokee cases, discussed in the next section,
But one question was clearly resolved: the issue of Indian title was a matter
of domestic law, not international law. According to the Chief Justice, "the
right of society, to prescribe those rules by which property may be acquired
and preserved is not, and cannot be drawn into question; as the title to
lands, especially, is and must be admitted to depend entirely on the law of
209
the nation in which they lie."
Thus, although the discovery doctrine was
a common law rule derived from international law, after discovery,
relations between the discovering nation and the natives were exclusively
matters of domestic law-an issue on which Chief Justice Marshall would
elaborate on in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia.210 The significance of this
aspect of the Johnson decision should not be overlooked : it essentially
meant that "the Courts of the conqueror" would be the venue in which
subsequent conflicts between Indians and settlers would be resolved,"'

206 . Id. 591 ; see also id at 573 ("The potentates of the old world found no difficulty in
convincing themselves that they made ample compensation to the inhabitants of the new, by bestowing
on them civilization and Christianity .").
207 . Later, in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U .S . (5 Pet) 1, 15 (1831), Marshall allowed some
of his feelings to show :
If courts were permitted to indulge their sympathies, a case better calculated to
excite them can scarcely be imagined . A people once numerous, powerful, and
truly independent, found by our ancestors in the quiet and uncontrolled
possession of an ample domain, gradually sinking beneath our superior policy,
our arts and our arms, have yielded their lands by successive treaties, each of
which contains a solemn guarantee of the residue .
Id. Marshall revealed similar sentiments in a letter he wrote to to his colleague Joseph Story in which he
reflected that the dispossession of Indian tribes under the Jackson Administration produced a "deep stain
on the American character." G . EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE,
1815-1835, at 714 (Oxford Univ . Press, abr_ ed ., 1991) (1988) (quoting Letter from Justice Marshall, to
Justice Story (Oct . 29, 1828)) .
208. See infra Part IV .
209 . Johnson, 21 U .S . at 572,
210 . See infra notes 292-300 and accompanying text . Confining the tribal-U .S . relations to
domestic law is one of Professor Williams' chief criticisms of the Johnson decision . See supra note 4 ;
see also Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of Conquest, supra note 2, at 116 (opining that "emerging
notions of customary and positive international law seek to protect the political, property, and cultural
rights of tribal and indigenous peoples and to prevent them from being subject to the political whim or
mercy of the independent nation in which such peoples are located") .
211 . Johnson, 21 U .S. at 588 .
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The record shows that this was perhaps the most enduring result of the
212
Johnson decision
While the discovery doctrine left Indian affairs to domestic law, the
doctrine itself had relatively little effect on tribal property rights . All it did,
according to the Johnson opinion, was to create a right of preemption in the
government and impose a partial restraint on alienation of Indian title, such
that only conveyances to the government could convey fee title. This
certainly served the important function of legitimizing the existing land title
system . But it also left most native property rights intact, especially their
rights of possession and use. As Marshall indicated, under the discovery
doctrine, the Indians "were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil,
with a legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it, and to use it
.,,213
The discovery doctrine did not, and
according to their own discretion
could not "annul the previous rights of those who had not agreed to it. It
regulated the right given by discovery among the European discoverers; but
214 Thus, Indian
could not affect the rights of those already in possession .
title is a product of native possession antedating discovery; it did not
depend on acknowledgment or recognition by a European discoverer . Later
decisions, which relied on Marshall's use of the term "occupants" to
diminish the property rights of aboriginal peoples, misconstrued the limited
215
Johnson's recognition of the discoverer's
nature of the Johnson decision .
right of preemption created only a kind of future interest in discovered
lands that could become possessory in the future ; it did not disturb the
natives' pre-existing right of possession, or any other property rights other
216
than their right to convey to their grantees alienable title to their lands
212. This decision on venue authorized Chief Justice Marshall's successors to hand down
rulings like those cited in supra notes 15-16 .
213 . Johnson, 21 U.S . at 574.
214 . Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S . (6 Pet.) 515, 544 (1832) .
215 . See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text; see also Bennett, supra note 37, at 622-27
(discussing other English and Commonwealth decisions denying the property rights of indigenous
peoples) .
216. Cohen, Original Title, supra note 14, at 48-49. The Cohen treatise refers to the
government's future interest as a reversionary interest . COHEN TREATISE, supra note 21, at 489
(describing the discoverer's interest as "naked fee title"). However, the characterization of the
government's interest as a reversionary interest is inapt, for that suggests that the government had a
property interest prior to the natives' possessory interest, which clearly did not exist . The government's
interest is instead a right of preemption . See supra notes 108, 213, infra notes 250, 254, and
accompanying text.
Professor Kades has suggested that the effect of the restraint on alienation imposed by the
government's right of preemption was to reduce the cost of expropriating Indian lands by giving the
government monopsony power, excluding other potential purchasers and stifling market competition for
Indian lands. 'this monopsony enabled the government to purchase the lands at bargain prices, which
was even cheaper than conquest. Kades, Dark Side, supra note 10, at 1103-05, 1189 . There is a certain
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CLARIFYING ABORIGINAL RIGHTS AND FEDERALIZING INDIAN
AFFAIRS : THE CHEROKEE CASES

The Marshall Court returned to the issues of Indian property and
217 The impetus
sovereignty eight years after it decided the Johnson case
was a bitter conflict between the Cherokee Nation and the State of Georgia.
The 1791 Treaty of Holston between the federal government and the
Cherokee "solemnly guarantee[d] to the Cherokee nation, all their lands not
herbey ceded [to the United States]," amounting to some five million acres
intuitive appeal of this law and economics explanation of Johnson's interpretation of the right of
government preemption inherent in Indian title, but there is no evidence that advancing efficient
appropriation of Indian lands was part of Marshall's thinking . In fact, he privately noted to his
colleague Story that he thought his country's treatment of the Indian tribes impressed a "deep stain on
the American character." WHITE, supra note 207, at 714 (quoting Letter from Justice Marshall, to
Justice Story, (Oct . 29, 1828)); see also infra note 221 (explaining his opposition to the removal of the
Creeks and Cherokee from Georgia) .
It is more likely that Marshall perceived his recognition of the government's right of
preemption as a protective ruling . NEWMYER, supra note 81, at 445 . In this respect, the opinion seems
in line with the 1787 Northwest Ordinance, Act of Aug, 7, 1789, ch . 8, 1 Stat . 50, 52 (promising "[t]he
utmost good faith" in negotiating for Indian lands and pledging not to take "their land and property . . .
without their consent"), the 1790 Nonintercourse Act, Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790, ch, 33, § 4, 1
Stat. 137, 138 (codified as amended in part at 25 U .S.C . § 177 (2000)) (asserting exclusive federal
jurisdiction over Indian lands and prohibiting state treaty-making to acquire Indian lands), and treaties
like that with the Creek Nation in 1790, Treaty with the Creeks, Aug. 7, 1790, 7 Star . 35 (ratifying first
treaty negotiated by the Washington Administration, which promised federal protection of the Creeks
and their reservation) . ROBERT V . HINE & JOHN MACK FARAGHER, THE AMERICAN WEST : A NEW
INTERPRETIVE HISTORY 120-21 (2000) . Marshall, a man who deeply distrusted state governments and
was a great admirer of Washington and also his biographer, see NEWMYER, supra note 81, at 235, 440,
would likely have thought that a federal right of preemption (which admittedly was not clarified until
the Cherokee cases) would curb probable abuses of the tribes by states and private parties . And it is
hard to imagine that most Indian tribes would have fared better had they possessed the authority to sell
lands to the states or the unscrupulous characters who populated the American frontier in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries . See HINE & FARAGHER, supra, at 113 (quoting Richard Henry Lee of
Virginia, who called for a strong federal presence inthe old Northwest Territory, due to the "uninformed
and perhaps licentious people" settling there) . Certainly the history of Indian affairs in the 180 years
after the Johnson decision hardly suggests that a freewheeling market for Indian lands would have
produced a better result for the tribes than the world of federal preemptury rights . On the contrary,
tribes have usually been better served with a distant sovereign, since both settlers and their immediate
governments wanted their land ; most tribes preferred the French to the British, the British to the
colonists, and the federal government to the states .
217 . Compare Johnson v . M'Intosh, 21 U .S . (8 Wheat,) 543 (1823) (describing the vestigal
property rghts attributable to native Americans in the wake of the discovery doctrine), with Cherokee
Nation v . Georgia 30 U .S . (5 Pet .) 1 (1831) (holding that the Court had no jurisdiction over the
controversy between the Cherokee tribe and the State of Georgia because the tribe was neither a state
nor a foreign nation . Marshall further analogized the tribe's standing to be that of a ward under the
guardianship of the federal government) and Worcester v . Georgia, 31 U .S . (6 Pet.) 515 (1832)
(rejecting Georgia's argument that the discovery doctrine effectively terminated Indian property rights
and holding that the discovery doctrine only provided the discoverer with the right, above all others, to
purchase land) . The latter two cases are collectively referred to as the Cherokee cases .
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of land inside the border of Georgia.
The Cherokee proceeded to adopt
many actions that made evident their intention to make the lands recognized
by the 1791 treaty their permanent homeland . They practiced agriculture
instead of hunting and adopted a written constitution in which they asserted
219
sovereignty over their territory .
The federal government, however, had promised the state, as a
condition of Georgia's cession of its western land claims (the last state to
do so, in 1802), that it would make efforts to extinguish Indian title within
the state "as soon as it could be done peaceably and on reasonable
220
terms ."
Beginning in 1824, the federal government carried out a brutal
221
campaign to remove Creek Indians in Georgia.
But when it failed to
extinguish Cherokee title (which technically was no longer Indian title, but
treaty-derived title) by the late 1820s, Georgia, anxious to settle and mine
222
In 1828, in the wake of the successful
Cherokee lands, took action
presidential campaign of Andrew Jackson, an old Indian fighter, the state
passed the first of two laws, which appropriated most of the Cherokee
lands, extended state law to Cherokee country, annulled Cherokee laws, and
required white persons residing in Cherokee country to have a permit from
223
the state
The state even executed one Cherokee man for murder
committed in Cherokee country, ignoring an order of the Supreme Court,
24
All
signed by Marshall, granting the Indian's petition for habeas corpus .
218 . Treaty with the Cherokees, July 2, 1791, an, VIl, 7 Stat. 39, 40; see also 1 CHARLES
WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 729 (rev . ed . 1947) (estimating that, until
the period of 1805-1819 when the federal government bought approximately one million acres of land
from them, the Cherokee nation owned about five million acres of land in Georgia) .
219 . FRANCIS PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE FORMATIVE YEARS 227,231 (1962) .
220 . Id. a t 227.
221 . NEWMYER, supra note 81, at 442 . The Creek campaign prompted Marshall's letter to
Story . See WHITE, supra note 207, at 714 (quoting Letter from Justice Marshall, to Justice Story (Oct,
29, 1828)), which was a response to a published speech by Justice Story in which Story defended the
Indians' right to their lands . Id. Chief Justice Marshall's response noted, `7 often think with indignation
on our disreputable conduct His 1 think) in the affair of the Creeks of Georgia ; and t look with some
alarm on the course [we are] now pursuing [against the Cherokee] ." NEWMYER, supra note 81, at 44142 .
222 . ROBERT N. CLINTON, ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW : CASES AND MATERIALS 145 (3d
ed.1991) .
223 . Id. The first statute was enacted on December 20, 1828, just nine days before Marshall
wrote to Story about his concerns over the threatened removal of the Cherokees, see WHITE, supra note
207, at 714 (quoting Letter from Justice Marshall, to Justice Story (Oct . 29, 1828)), and the second a
year later, on December 19, 1829 . NEWMYER, supra note 81, at 442 . Several states, including Georgia,
Alabama, Mississippi, and Tennessee, enacted what were known as "Indian laws" in the 1820s,
requiring Indians to pay state taxes, serve in the state militia, and work on state highways . The object of
these laws was to encourage the Indians to relocate to the West, across the Mississippi River. WHITE,
supra note 207, at 711 & n.130 .
224 . Joseph C . Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics, and Morality, 21 STAN . L .
REv . 500, 512 (1969); NEWMYER, supra note 81, at 447 (discussing the execution of Com Tassel in
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of these actions appeared to be inconsistent with the 1791 treaty, but the
Cherokee could expect no help from the federal government : with the
support of the Jackson Administration, Congress enacted the Indian
Removal Act in 1830, which required the Indians to agree to relocate west
of the Mississippi River or submit to state law.225 With no prospects of help
in Congress or the Jackson Administration, the Cherokee filed an original
action in the U.S. Supreme Court, hoping to enjoin the state's actions 226
Georgia ignored the suit, failing even to appear before the Court, and
made clear its intent to ignore any adverse ruling from the Court 227
Certainly, the Jackson Administration was unlikely to enforce such a ruling .
Jackson himself was well aware of the strategy of the Cherokee's attorney,
William Wirt, to make the case part of the presidential campaign of 1832,
228
The politically charged
and therefore denounced the Court proceedings.
atmosphere induced Congress to consider repealing section 25 of the
229
Judiciary Act of 1789, which would have revoked the Supreme Court's
jurisdiction over state court decisions 230
As he did in Marbury v. Madison three decades earlier, 231 Marshall
delivered an opinion that established foundational principles while avoiding
political controversy by denying that the Court had jurisdiction over the
controversy. 232 Wirt argued that the Cherokee were a foreign nation, and
December 1830) (citing JILL NORCREN, THE CHEROKEE CASES : THE CONFRONTAIION OF LAW AND
POLITICS 95-98 (1996)) .
225. Indian Removal Act of 1830, ett. 148, 7 Star. 411, 411 ; CHARLES F . HOBSON, THE GREAT
CHIEF JUSTICE : JOHN MARSHALL AND THE RULE OF LAW 171 (1996) ; see also WHITE, supra note 207,
at 715-17 (discussing the debates on the Indian Removal Act) .
226 . Professor Newmyer has suggested that the reason for filing an original action in the
Supreme Court was political . The Cherokee's lead attorney was William Win, a well-known member
of the Supreme Court bar (who later was the principal speaker at Gettysburg the day Lincoln delivered
his memorable address), and who would run against Jackson in the 1832 election on the Antimason
Party ticket . NEwmEYER, supra note 81, at 445-46. Win saw Cherokee removal as a campaign issue,
as did several other members of an informal group of Cherokee advisors, several of which were running
for president or vice-president in 1832 (including Henry Clay, Daniel Webster, and John Sergeant) and
wanted a decision of the Supreme Court quickly, before the election, which was unlikely if he filed suit
first in state court, where delay was likely . Id. at 446-47 ; see also WHITE, supra note 207, at 719
(detailing Wirt's fear that Georgia would refuse to create a record necessary to file a writ of error and
that he rejected a suit in federal district court due to the opposition of William Johnson, in whose circuit
the case would be filed) .
227 . WHITE, supra note 207, at 730-31 . Georgia also failed to appear in the Worcester case to
follow . Id. at 731 ; NEWMYER, supra note 81, at 447 .
228 . HOBSON, supra note 225, at 174 ; see also supra note 226.
229 . Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat.73, 88 .
230 . HOBSON, supra note 225, at 174 .
231 . Marbury v . Madison, 5 U.S . (1 Crunch) 137 (1803) (establishing judicial review of
executive and congressional actions) .
232 . Cherokee Nation v . Georgia, 30 U.S . (5 Pet .) 1, 20 (1831) . The decision was handed down
only four days after oral argument. WHITE, supra note 207, at 724 . Professor Frickey has noted the
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thus the Court would have original jurisdiction over a suit between the tribe
234 Marshall's
and Georgia.233 But only two of the six justices agreed .
opinion rejected the notion that the Cherokee tribe was either a state or a
235
He acknowledged the tribe "as a distinct political
foreign nation
236
But
instead of a state
society . . . capable of managing its own affairs ."
or a foreign nation, Marshall claimed that the Cherokee were a "domestic
dependent nation[]," one that had lost control over its external affairs, was
dependent on the United States for protection, and reduced to "a state of
237
He described the tribe's relationship with the federal
pupilage ."
23e
Like
government as "resembl[ing] that of a ward to his guardian ."
239
this statement about
Marshall's statements about conquest in Johnson,
the dependence of the Cherokee on the United States was completely
ahistorical, made up out of whole cloth. In fact, until around 1830 the
unusual nature of the Cherokee Nation opinion, which began by discussing the merits of the case,
"rather than the analytically anterior question of jurisdiction," of which the Court ultimately decided
there was none . Frickey,Marshalling, supra note 25, at 391 .
233 . U .S . CONST. art . 111, § 2, cl . 1-2 (defining Supreme Court original jurisdiction to include
suits between a state and foreign states) .
234. Justices Thompson and Story concluded that the tribe was a foreign nation which
possessed, according to Thompson's dissent, "the right of self government, according to their own
usages and customs ; and with the competency to act in a national capacity . . . . [Tlhere is as full and
complete recognition of their sovereignty, as if they were the absolute owners of the soil ." Cherokee
Nation, 30 U .S. at 55 . Thompson noted that the only limitation on Indian ownership was "the right of
the Indians to transfer the absolute title of their lands to any other than ourselves ." Id Story, who
signed on to Thompson's opinion but did not write one himself, was apparently among a group of
informal advisors to the Cherokee, which included the politicians mentioned supra note 226, and
Chancellor James Kent. NEWMYER, supra note 81, at 446 .
235 . Cherokee Nation, 30 U .S, at 19 .
236. Id . at 16. In this regard, Marshall wrote :
[The Cherokee] have been uniformly treated as a state from the settlement of our
country . The numerous treaties made with them . . . recognize them as a people
capable of maintaining the relations of peace and war, of being responsible in
their political character for any violation of their engagements. . . . The acts ofour
government plainly recognize the Cherokee nation as a state, and the courts are
bound by those acts .
Id. Despite this recognition of the Cherokee as a separate "state," the tribe was not one of the United
States, for the reasons given infra note 241 .
to,
at 19 ("We perceive plainly that the
237 . Cherokee Nation, 30 U .S . at 17 ; see also
[Commerce Clause of the] constitution . . . does not comprehend Indian tribes in the general term
`foreign nations ;' not we presume because a tribe may not be a nation, but because it is not foreign to
the United States,") .
238 . Id, at 17 . This language, which was unnecessary dicta in this opinion, would later be
viewed as the wellspring of the federal government's "plenary" power over dependent tribes . See
Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of Conquest, supra note 2, at 110-25 (arguing that the plenary power
doctrine is an extra-constitutional source of authority over Indian tribes, which has undermined tribal
sovereignty); Clinton, No Federal Supremacy, supra note 23, at 144 (interpreting an agreement with the
Sioux nation to reinforce an "extant tribal-federal intergovernmental relationship") .
239 . See supra notes 194-98, 201 and accompanying text .
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United States and the Indian tribes had treated each other largely as foreign
states and dealt with each other largely through treaties, as the two
dissenters pointed out. 240
Nevertheless, there was no Supreme Court jurisdiction over the dispute
because the Court determined that the tribe was neither a state nor a foreign
government,241 and therefore it could not invoke the Court's original
jurisdiction . In so ruling, Marshall restated the discovery doctrine, omitting
He asserted that "the Indians are
language related to conquest.
acknowledged to have an unquestionable . . . right to the lands they occupy,
until that right shall be extinguished by a voluntary cession to our
govemment' a42 Thus, the decision avoided a constitutional confrontation
between the state and the Supreme Court, while reaffirming the
independent nature of Indian tribes, softening the discovery doctrine by
dropping the conquest language, and suggesting that the federal government
owed the tribes a duty of protection similar to that which guardians owe
wards.
Only a year later, the issue of state versus tribal sovereignty was back
243
Two missionaries,
before the Court in the case of Worcester v. Georgia.
Samuel Worcester and Eliza Butler, were convicted in Georgia courts of
residing in Cherokee country without a state license and sentenced to four
240 . Cherokee Nation, 30 U .S . at 54 (Thompson, J., dissenting) . The dissent was not published
simultaneously with the decision on March 18, 1831, but instead, was published later at the suggestion
of Marshall, who also collaborated in the publication of a pamphlet making public all of the opinions in
the case . WHITE, supra note 207, at 730.
Justice Johnson wrote a separate concurrence in which he criticized Marshall for discussing
the merits of the case when there was nojurisdietion and insulted the Indians by referring to them as "a
people so low in the grade of organized society" that they were insignificant. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S .
at 21, 25 (Johnson, J ., concurring) ("Must every pretty kraal of Indians, designating themselves a tribe
or nation, and having a few hundred acres of land to hunt on exclusively, be recognized as a state?").
Johnson also suggested that the Indians had forfeited their natural rights to land, due to their "inveterate
habits," which resisted assimilation into republican culture, and he noted the "restless, warlike, and
signally cruet" actions of the Indians during the Revolutionary War . Id. at 23-24 .
241 . Cherokee Nation, 30 U .S . at 19 . Marshall observed that the Cherokee's own counsel had
demonstrated that the tribe was not a state . Id. at 16 . Nor were the Indians a foreign nation, since they
were "so completely under the sovereignty and dominion of the United States" that were they to ally
with a foreign country, such an action would be considered "by all as an ilvasion of our territory, and an
act of hostility_" Id. at 17-18_ Moreover, the Constitution singled out tribes from the "several states"
and "foreign nations" in the Commerce Clause, giving a textual justification for the conclusion that
Indian tribes could not invoke the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction . Id. at l8_ "We perceive
plainly that the [Commerce Clause of the] constitution . . . does not comprehend Indian tribes in the
general term `foreign nations,' not we presume because a tribe may not be a nation, but because it is not
foreign to the United States ." Id. at 19. Note, however, that this passage seems to indicate that the
tribes were in fact sovereigns,just not foreign sovereigns . See Frickey, Marshalling, supra note 25, at
392 .
242 . Cherokee Nation, 30 U .S . at 17 .
243 . Worcester v . Georgia, 31 U .S . (6 Pet) 515 (1832) .
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244
The defendants appealed their convictions to the
years of hard labor.
U.S. Supreme Court, which agreed to reenter the controversy that it avoided
the year before . Wirt again argued the case, contending that the Georgia
245
even
law violated the Cherokee's treaty-guaranteed property rights,
though the case was clearly about the liberty of the missionaries and the
sovereign authority of the State of Georgia to restrict that liberty . In
Worcester v. Georgia, handed down almost exactly one year after the
decision in Cherokee Nation, Marshall upheld the Court's jurisdiction over
the caSC46 and wrote an opinion for the Court that has been called "the
clearest, most complete articulation of the concept of aboriginal rights to be
found in the American legal system ."247 Worcester resolved ambiguities
about the nature of Cherokee sovereignty, while repudiating the language
concerning conquest in the Johnson decision .
Although the basic issue in Worcester concerned the applicability of
Georgia laws in Cherokee country, Marshall revisited Indian title questions
as well, perhaps assuming that if the Cherokee possessed no property rights,
Georgia sovereignty over the area would be unquestioned . Georgia's
argument that discovery terminated Cherokee property rights was squarely
rejected by the Court, which noted that the tribe continued to exercise
248
sovereignty over a land base without (until recently) state interference .
The Indians were "a distinct people" who "govern[ed] themselves by their
own laws," and discovery did not "give the discoverer rights in the country
discovered, which annulled the pre-existing rights of its ancient
possessors ,'249 Discovery instead gave the discoverer only "the exclusive
244. Worcester and Butler were initially released by the Georgia Superior Court because "they
were federal employees, who were exempt from the [state] law ." WHITE, supra note 207, at 730-31_
But apparently wishing to test the law, they refused to leave Cherokee country, and Worcester resigned
his position as federal postmaster. Id. at 731 . Arrested again, convicted, and sentenced, they refused a
pardon and instead appealed to the U .S . Supreme Court, claiming that the superior court decision was
the highest court in the state "in which a decision could be had" in the case. Id. The clerk of the state
superior court surprisingly forwarded the records of the trial (unsigned by the trial judge), but the state
ignored the appeal and made clear that it would ignore any Court decision overturning the convictions .
Id. at 730-31 .
245 . See NEWMYER, supra note 81, at 451 .
246. Marshall noted that the missionaries were imprisoned under a state law alleged to be in
violation of federal treaty rights . Worcester, 31 U .S . at 540 . The Court therefore had jurisdiction under
section 25 of the Judiciary Act, Marshall noting that "[t]hose who fill the judicial department have no
discretion in selecting the subjects to be brought before them ." Id. at 54 t .
247 . Berman, supra note 24, at 660 . Justice McLean concurred in the result. Worcester, 31
U .S. at 563 (McLean, J ., concurring) ; see also infra note 278 . Justice Baldwin dissented, but wrote no
opinion . Justice Johnson, whose concurrence in Cherokee Nation denied the governmental status of the
Cherokee, Cherokee Nation, 30 U .S. at 21-31 (Johnson, J . . concurring), was absent due to health
reasons. WHITE, supra note 207, at 732 . See also supra note 240 (discussing Johnson's concurrence) .
248 . Worcester, 31 U .S. at 559-60 .
249 . Id at 542-43 .
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right to purchase ; 25° therefore, there was no conflict between the
possessory rights of the natives and the discovery rights of Europeans.
As for the suggestion in Johnson that discovery included a theory of
251
conquest, Marshall engaged in a lengthy reconsideration of the history of
Indian relations from the colonial charters to British policies and to treaties
made by the United States after independence . 52 He was now convinced
that the contention that the colonial charters gave sovereign rights over the
natives in possession of the land was an "extravagant and absurd idea . . .
[which] did not enter the mind of any man ." 253 All the charters conveyed
was that which the King had to give: his "exclusive right of purchasing
such lands as the natives were willing to sell .,,254 Further, the charters
authorized no wars of conquest; they contemplated only defensive wars. 55
256
The
charters thus
Invasions of native territory required `just causes."
gave no rights against the native possessors, merely rights against
competing Europeans discoverers.
According to Marshall, colonial practice confirmed his view of the
257
The British government avoided interfering with
colonial charters
native self-government-its interest was in excluding foreign powers and
forbidding foreign land sales .258 The Crown "purchased [native] alliance
250 . Id at 544 .
251 . See supra notes 194-95,201 and accompanying text .
252 . Worcester, 31 U .S . at 542-52 . According to Professor White, this historical exegesis was
the vehicle by which Marshall convinced himself that whatever natural law rights of property and selfdetermination the Cherokee once possessed were lost to the superior power and civilization of the
Anglo-Americans, which now, under the Constitution, treaties, and statutes, owed a federal a duty of
protection to the dependent tribes . WHITE, supra note 207, at 733-35 . This "actual state of things," in
Marshall's words, Worcester, 31 U .S . at 560, was central to his constitutional analysis, which Professor
White maintains was a "fascinating exercise in converting the natural law argument to arguments based
on the sovereign powers of the Union and of his Court" WHITE, supra note 207, at 732 .
Professor Newmyer substantially agrees with Professor White, concluding that in
Marshall's view "law followed history . . . divestting] the Indians of all innate claims to their homeland
By preserving the distinction between `is' and `ought,' . . . denying the innate morality of law, [and] . . .
tying Native American law to the outcome of history, to `the actual state of things,' to `power, war,
[and] conquest."' NEws YER, supra note 81, at 452 . 1 do not quarrel with these observations
concerning the loss of the Indians natural law property rights, but I maintain that, whether derived from
natural law or from positive law, the proprietary rights of the Indians were significant in the wake of the
Worcester decision .
253 . Worcester, 31 U .S . at 544-45 .
254 . Id. at 545 . "The crown could not be understood to grant what the crown did not affect to
claim; nor was it so understood ." Id.
255 . Id.
256 . Id. ; see also id. at 547 ("[O]ur history furnishes no example . . . of any attempt on the part
of the crown to interfere with the internal affairs of the Indians, farther than to keep out the agents of
foreign powers, who, as traders or otherwise, might seduce them into foreign alliances .") .
257 . Id. at 517-18 .
258 . Id. at 547 .
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and dependence by subsidies; but never intruded into the interior of [native]
affairs .,,2'9
The Proclamation of 1763, Marshall maintained, was
recognition of native sovereignty within Indian country and operated to ban
260
Other colonial authorities fostered
settler purchases of Indian title there.
trade between the settlers and the natives while attempting "no claim to
their lands, [and] no dominion over their persons."26t Rather, the colonial
authorities merely provided the sort of protection that an ally would supply,
262
"without involving a surrender of [native] national character ."
This state of affairs, according to the Chief Justice, was not materially
altered when the United States succeeded to the claims of the British
crown 263 In the 1783 peace treaty, the British did not purport to convey to
the United States what the Crown never had: sovereign control over the
native tribes .26' The new nation proceeded to sign many treaties with the
Indians in which it promised the tribes military protection . Two such
treaties were the Treaties of Hopewell and Holston with the Cherokee,
which included provisions recognizing a right of Cherokee selfgovernment .265 Marshall maintained that the treaty promises of United
States protection coexisted with promises of tribal self-government; the
266
These
former was not thought to be inconsistent with the latter .
of
federal
protection,
which
Marshall
emphasized
rather
sovereign promises
than recognizing any remaining Indian natural law rights, diminished Indian
sovereignty, but left their property rights, as acknowledged by the discovery
doctrine, intact .

259 . Id. Marshall admitted that, had the colonists been "sufficiently powerful," they might have
attempted to seize Indian lands "without negotiation or purchase from the native Indians . But this
course is believed to have been nowhere taken . A more conciliaory mode was preferred, and one which
was better calculated to impress the Indians, who were then powerful, with a sense of the justice of their
white neighbours ." Id. at 579-80.
260 . Id. a t 548 . On the proclamation, see Clinton, Proclamation, supra note 54.
261 . Worcester, 31 U .S . at 552,
262 . Id.
263 . Id.
264 . Id. at 560 ("[T]he king of Great Britain, at the treaty of peace, could cede only what
belonged to his crown") . The British policy consistently "recogniz[ed the Indians'] title to self
government ." Id
265 . See, e.g., id. at 560-61 (noting that protection provided to a weaker power by a stronger
power did not mean the weaker relinquished its independence) .
266 . National policy was to "consider the several Indian nations as distinct political
communities, having territorial boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive, and having a right
to all the lands within those boundaries." Worcester, 31 U .S . at 557 . Cohen's treatise maintained that
"Worcester . . . concluded that the guardian-ward relationship did not abolish preexisting tribal powers
or make the tribes dependent upon federal law for their powers of self-government." COHEN TREAI ISE,
supra note 21, at 233-34 .
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The federal protection Marshall found in the Constitution, statutes, and
treaties was critical to the outcome in Worcester because the issue
concerned whether state laws could operate in Indian country, and thereby
211
Marshall concluded that the
deprive the Cherokee of their sovereignty.
government
and
the Cherokee Nation
treaties between the federal
"mark[ed] out the boundary that separate[d] the Cherokee country from
Georgia; guarant[ced] to [the tribe] all the land within their boundary ;
solemnly pledge[d] the faith of the United States to restrain their citizens
from trespassing on it; and recognize[d] the pre-existing power of the
nation to govern itself."268 Consequently, the attempt by Georgia to extend
its laws over Cherokee country violated the territorial and sovereign rights
recognized by the treaties, which were the supreme law of the land . The
state laws also conflicted with the Constitution's Indian Commerce
Clause 26' and the federal Trade and Intercourse Act, which reserved Indian
affairs to the federal government .270 Consequently, the Court held that the
applicable Georgia laws were "void, as being repugnant to the constitution,
treaties, and laws of the United States," and thus the Court ordered
Worcester released from jail 2'1

267 . Worcester, 31 U .S. at 590-91,
268 . Id at 561-62; see also id at 557 (noting that federal law treated Indian tribes as "distinct
political communities, having territorial boundaries, within which . . . is not only acknowledged, but
guarantied by the United States .") .
269 . U.S . CONST. art I, § 8, cl . 3 .
270 . Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790, ch . 33, § 4, 1 Stat . 137, 138 (codified as amended in
part at 25 U .S,C . § 177 (2000)) . The original version of die Act read as follows :
no sale of lands made by any Indians, or any nation or tribe of Indians within the
United States, shall be valid to any person or persons, or to any state, whether
having the right of pre-emption to such lands or not, unless the same shall be
made and duly executed at some public treaty, held under the authority of the
United States .
Id. (emphasis added) . This provision has remained substantially the same . Compare § 4, 1 Star. at 138,
with 25 U .S.C . § 177 (2000) .
271 . Worcester, 31 U .S . at 562-63 . However, Georgia refused to release the missionaries, and
eight months after the Worcester decision, they authorized their lawyer to press ahead with an appeal to
the Supreme Court to notify President Jackson that the state was frustrating a decree of the Court .
However, shortly thereafter, the missionaries decided to drop their appeal and seek a pardon from the
Georgia governor, which was granted in January 1833 . The result allowed the recently reelected
Jackson to avoid the prospect of possible expansion of the nullification crisis, involving South
Carolina's objections to the protectionist federal tariff, to Georgia and other southern states over Indian
affairs and failure to abide by Supreme Court orders. WHITE, supra note 207, at 737-38 . In 1992, over
160 years later, the State of Georgia issued another pardon, calling the Worcester incident "a stain on
the history of criminal justice in Georgia" and expressing regret over usurping the Cherokee's
sovereignty and ignoring the Supreme Court . JUDITH V_ ROYSTER & MICHAEL C. BLUMM, NATIVE
AMERICAN NATURAL RESOURCES LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 53 (2002) (citing Georgia to Pardon 2
in Indian Land Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov_ 23, 1992, at A13) .
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The Worcester Court's decision to uphold the territorial sovereignty of
272
the Cherokee Nation became a bedrock principle of federal Indian law,
sharply limiting state authority over Indian tribes, at least until the era of the
Rehnquist Court. 273 The decision also had an important effect on Indian
proprietary rights by denying states the authority to extinguish Indian
275 Johnson involved
title, 274 an issue left undecided in Johnson v. M'Intosh.
western lands not within a state, and the governmental right of preemption
the Court recognized could have been interpreted as extending to either the
federal government or to states, or to both . 276 In contrast, Worcester
concerned Indian lands within the boundaries of one of the original thirteen
states 277 Notwithstanding these distinctions, Chief Justice Marshall's
278
answer was an emphatic "no" to the possibility of state extinguishment
272. See, e.g., WILKINSON, supra note 19, at 158 n_l26 (noting that Worcester was the fourth
most cited pre-Civil War case by federal and state courts between 1970 and 1985); Frickey,
Marshalling, supra note 25, at 402-17 (maintaining Worcester laid the foundation for (1) the reserved
rights doctrine, the notion that Indian treaties were grants of rights from tribes to the federal
government, not vice versa, and (2) the clear statement rule, requiring Congress to clearly and
unambiguously terminate ruled sovereignty).
273. See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey, A Common law for Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial
Divestiture of Indian Tribal Authority over Nonmembers, 109 YALE L.J . 1, 4-6 (1999) [hereinafter
Frickey, Common Larv] (explaining the Rehnquist Court's steady erosion of tribal sovereignty over
nonmembers, which Professor Frickey claimed is usurping the congressional role of implementing the
ongoing process of colonialism) ; Ralph W. Johnson, Chief Justice Rehnquist and the Indian Cases, 16
PUB. LAND L. REv. 1, 7, 24-25 (1995) (accusing the Rehnquist Court of pursuing a "termination
policy" inconsistent with Worcester by authorizing state regulation in Indian country).
274. See, e.g., City of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S . 226, 240 (1985) (rejecting a
treaty between the tribe and the state as extinguishing Indian title) .
275. See generally Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S, (8 Wheat.) 543, 569 (1823) ; see supra text
proceeding, accompanying, and following notes 192-93 .
276. See id. at 585 (stating that "either the United States, or the several states . . . [had] the
exclusive power to extinguish [Indian title]") ; see also supra note 186 and accompanying text.
277. The original thirteen states were Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Maryland,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, and Virginia.
278. Worcester, 31 U.S . at 557 (`The treaties and laws of the United States contemplate the
Indian territory as completely separated from that of the states ; and provide that all intercourse with
them shall be carried on exclusively by the government of the union."). Marshall further delineated the
extent of Cherokee sovereignty, writing:
The Cherokee nation . . . is a distinct community occupying its own territory,
with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no
force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, list with the assent
of the Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of
congress . The whole intercourse between the United States and this nation, is, by
our constitution and laws, vested m the government of the United States .
Id. at 561 .

Justice McLean concurred in the judgment, disputing the assumption in Marshall's opinion
that tribes were enduring political bodies with a geographical base . He considered the tribes to be
temporary settlements "always subject . . . to encroachments from the settlements around them ." Id. at
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In the wake of the Worcester decision, it was apparent that under the
discovery doctrine 279 Indian tribes retained important possessory and
governance rights . There was a territorial division between states and
Indian country: tribes possessed territorial sovereignty within the latter,
where state laws did not govern . Tribes were owed federal protection, and
only the federal government could extinguish Indian title through purchase .
However, Marshall's interpretation of an exclusive federal authority over
Indian affairs benefited the Cherokee Nation very little in the hands of the
280
Jackson Administration which, under the 1830 Indian Removal Act,
proceeded to carry out a federal removal policy, which led to the "trail of
tears" and near genocide .281
In 1835, three years after the Worcester decision, the Marshall Court
considered Indian title for the final time, in what turned out to be the Chief
252
Mitchel v. United States concerned title to Florida
Justice's last year .
lands acquired by a settler from an Indian tribe prior to the United States'
acquisition of Florida from Spain in 1819 283 The Court, in an opinion by
Justice Baldwin, ruled that Indian title purchased by non-Indians could
become fee title if the federal sovereign ratified the transaction 284 The
594 (McLean, J ., concurring). Where tribal self-government would be "inconsistent with the political
welfare of the states, and the social welfare of the advancement of its citizens," state law would trump
tribal sovereignty . Id. This view would culminate in the enactment of the General Allotment Act in
1887 . See ROYSTER & BLUMm, supra note 271, at 40-41 (discussing the General Allotment Act, Act of
Feb_ 8, 1887, ch . 119, 24 Start. 388 (1887) (repealed 2000)) ; see also infra note 297 and accompanying
text .
279 . However, Marshall and others' political agenda of making the treatment of the Cherokee
and other tribes a political issue in the 1832 election, see supra note 226 and accompanying text, came
to naught, as President Jackson was easily reelected, frustrating Marshall's effort to have a president
other than Jackson installed, who might appoint his colleague, Story, as his successor . See NEWMYER,
supra note 81, at 456 (claiming that Marshall "hurried the litigation" and encouraged the publication of
dissents in Cherokee Nation in an effort to help defeat Jackson) .
280. Indian Removal Act of 1830, eh . 148, 7 Star . 411 .
281 . In the words of Professor White, "the federal government simply stepped in and itself
continued the (state's] policy of dispossession." WHITE, supra note 207, at 736 . Jackson's alleged
response to the case, "John Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it," is probably
apocryphal . See HOBSON, supra note 225, at 179. The aftermath of the Worcester decision is explained
in Burke, supra note 224, at 500-32 .
282 . Chief Justice Marshall died of an illness "that had plagued him for many years" on July 6,
1835, at age 79 . NEWMYER, supra note 81, at 461,
283 . Mitchel v . United States, 34 U .S . (9 Pet.) 711, 725 (1835) . The acquisition of Florida from
Spain by treaty in 1819 was prompted by Indian raids on Georgia from Spanish Florida, which in turn
induced General Andrew Jackson to invade Florida and defeat the Creek Nation . Spain subsequently
agreed to cede Florida to the United States in return for payment of claims and a guarantee of protecting
its Texas border . See COGGINS ET AL ., supra note 127, at 38 .
284 . Mitchel, 34 U .S . at 758-59 . This result in effect justified the Illinois and Wabash
Company's continuous (but unsuccessful) efforts to obtain congressional ratification of their purchases
in the years prior to the Johnson decision . See supra notes 122-25 and accompanying text.
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Court described Indian title as being a "perpetual right of possession" and
noted the existence of a "uniform rule" from the first British settlement:
"friendly Indians were protected in the possession of the lands they
occupied, and were considered as owning them . . . as their common
property, from generation to generation .""' The fact that the Indians used
their lands as a commons for hunting was irrelevant, for "their hunting
grounds were as much in their actual possession as the cleared fields of the
whites"; they retained exclusive possession "until they abandoned them,
286
made a cession to the government, or an authorized sale to individuals.
However, a private purchase of Indian title required federal ratification if
287
Thus, the discovery
the purchaser was to obtain freely alienable title
communally
held lands unless
protected
Indian
possession
of
doctrine
abandoned, and terminating that possession required federal purchase and
Indian consent. According to the Court, Indian title was "as sacred as the
fee."288
The Mitchel Court also squarely rejected the notion that conquest could
extinguish Indian title. According to Justice Baldwin, in the treaties with
the Indians, "the king [of England] waived all rights accruing by conquest
or cession, and thus most solemnly acknowledged that the Indians had
rights of property which they could cede or reserve."289 Because it stood in
the same position as the English monarch, the United States could not
290
assume a right of conquest renounced by its predecessor.
V, THE LEGACY OF THE MARSHALL COURT DECISIONS

Over a quarter-century, in five different opinions, the Marshall Court
outlined the contours of the discovery doctrine and the related concepts of
Indian title and native sovereignty. Discovery gave discoverers only an
exclusive right to purchase, excluding other European competitors . It
simultaneously imposed a partial restraint on alienation on the Indian tribes,
forbidding fee sales to anyone but the discovering sovereign or its
successors . Except for this restraint, Indian title-which is based on pre285, Mitchel, 34 U.S. at 745. Private purchases without federal ratification amount to purchases
of Indian title, which, like the land titles purchased in Johnson, could be extinguished by a subsequent
cession from the Indians to the federal government . See supra note 162 and accompanying text
(describing private purchases of Indian title as executory interests) .
286. Mitchel, 34 U.S . at 746.
287 . See id. at 758 ("The Indian right to lands as property, was . . . that of alienation . . . subject
only to ratification from the govemor representing the king .").
288. Id. at 746.
289. Id. at 749.
290. Id. at 754.
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existing possession, not governmental recognition-was as sacred as the
fee. The self-governing status of Indian tribes was left largely unaffected
by the discovery doctrine . Tribes entered into treaties to obtain federal
protection, but except for losing the ability to conduct foreign relations,
tribal sovereignty was unimpaired . Further, tribal sovereignty was buffered
from state laws by the Indian Commerce Clause, treaties, and the federal
291
Federal supremacy over Indian affairs
Trade and Intercourse Act
of
foreclosed state extinguishment Indian title.
Over the years, subsequent courts and Congresses misinterpreted the
Marshall Court's language and undermined the principles it laid down . In
292
particular, the guardian/ward language in the Cherokee Nation case was
transformed from a concept protective of tribal prerogatives into one that
293
This
gave Congress virtually unbridled power over Indian affairs
"plenary power" authority, described by one commentator as a
,'mystique' -;294 and by another as "extra-constitutional, "295 became the
vehicle to justify federal policies undermining tribal self-government in
ways never imagined by the Marshall Court. These policies included
296
extending federal criminal jurisdiction throughout Indian country and

291 . U .S . CoNs'r . art . 1, § 8, el . 3 (Indian Commerce Clause); Trade and Intercourse Act of
1790, ch . 33, 1 Son, 137 (codified as amended in part at 25 U .S .C . § 177 (2000)); see also supra note 72
(citing several treaties) .
292. Cherokee Nation v . Georgia, 30 U .S . (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831) (describing the tribe's
relationship with the federal government as "resemble[ing] that of a ward to his guardian") ; see also
supra note 238 and accompanying text.
293 . See Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power over Indians : Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations,
132 U . PA. L. REV . 195, 198 (1984) [hereinafter Newton, Federal Power] (concluding that the courts
should apply an intermediate standard of review to "legislation affecting Indians") ; Clinton, Redressing
the Legacy of conquest, supra note 2, at 110-25 (discussing the effect of Congress's claimed plenary
power over tribal sovereignty) ; see also the colloquy between Professor Williams, Robert A. Williams,
Jr ., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law : The Hard Trail of Decolonization and Americanizing the Mrite
Man's Indian Law, 1986 Wisc . L. REV . 219 (1986), and Professor Laurence, Robert Laurence, Learning
to Live with the Plenary Power of Congress over Indian Nations : An Essay in Reaction to Professor
Williams' Algebra, 30 ARtz, L . REV. 413 (1988); the reply by Professor Williams, Robert A . Williams,
Jr., Learning Not to Live with Eurocentric Myopia : A Reply to Professor Laurence's Learning to Live
with the Plenary Power of Congress over the Indian Nations, 30 ARtz. L . REV . 439 (1988) ; and the
rejoinder by Professor Laurence, Robert Laurence, On Eurocentric Myopia, the Designated Hitter Rule,
and "The Actual State of Things, " 30 ARiz. L . REV . 459 (1988) .
294 . Newton, Federal Power, supra note 293, at 199 .
295, Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of Conquest, supra note 2, at 99 ; see also Clinton, No
Federal Supremacy, supra note 23, at 118 .
296 . Act of Mar. 3, 1885, eh . 341, § 9, 23 Stat . 362, 385 (Major Crimes Act) (codified at 18
U .S .C . § 1153 (2000)) (giving the federal government the authority to prosecute murder and other
serious crimes by Indians against Indians on-reservation) . This Act was enacted in response to Ex parse
Crow Dog, 109 U .S . 556, 571-72 (1883), where the Court recognized exclusive tribal jurisdiction over
crimes committed on-reservation by and against Indians, despite treaty language subjecting the Sioux
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physically breaking up reservations into individual parcels (which often
were made available to non-Indians) in an effort to foster agrarianism and
Christianity through the allotment program . 97 In upholding the latter, the
Court ruled that Congress possessed the authority to unilaterally abrogate
39s
Later, the Court would misconstrue the language of
treaty promises
"occupancy title" in Johnson v. M'Intosh299 to deny compensation for
government takings of Indian title land 300
This does not mean, however, that subsequent courts completely
eroded U.S aboriginal title and native sovereignty. For example, the
Supreme Court has held that acts of Congress terminating Indian title must
301 Thus, a series of executive and congressional
be "clear and plain ."
actions that mistakenly assumed that tribal aboriginal title lands were public
lands did not terminate Indian title. 02 Neither was Indian title terminated
by the issuance of a lease , 303 nor a federal land patent, 304 nor a treaty

Tribe to federal laws . See also United States v . Kagama, 118 U .S . 375, 381 (1886) (upholding the
Major Crimes Act based on the plenary power doctrine) .
297 . Act of Feb . 8, 1887, ch . 119, 24 Stat. 388, 390 (General Allotment Act (Dawes Act)),
repealed by Indian Land Consolidation Act Amendments of 2000, Pub, L . No . 106-462, § 106(a)(1),
114 Star. 1991, 2007 (codified at 25 U .S .C . § 2201 note (2000)); see also COHEN TREATISE, supra note
21, at 130-34 ; FREDERICK E. HOME, A FINAL PROMISE: THE CAMPAIGN TO ASSIMILATE'PHE INDIANS,
1880-1920, at 49-50 (1984) (downplaying the importance of Indian rights in favor of settlers); Judith V .
Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ . ST. L .J . t, 9 (1995) (noting that the allotment policy
resembled in many respects the goals of the former reservation policy) .
298 . Lone Wolf v . Hitchcock, 187 U.S . 553, 565-68 (1903); see Symposium: Lone Wolf v.
Hitchcock One Hundred Years Later, 28 TULSA L. Rev . 1-157 (2002).
299, Johnson v . M'Intosh, 21 U .S . (8 Wheat .) 543, 574 (1823) ; see also supra notes 161, 178
and accompanying text.
300 . Tee-Hit=eon Indians v, United States, 348 U .S . 272, 281 (1955) ; see also Newton, Whim of
the Sovereign, supra note 185, at 1244 (criticizing the decision's distinction between recognized
aboriginal title and suggesting that the result was due to fiscal and political considerations, not legal
precedent) . Government takings of title recognized by treaty or statute are of course compensable. See
United States v . Sioux Nation, 448 U.S . 371, 373 (1980) (holding that government taking of the Black
Hills requires payment ofjust compensation) .
301 . United States ex eel. Hualpai Indians v . Same Fe Pac. R .R, 314 U .S . 339, 353 (1941) ; see
also Menominee Tribe v, United States, 391 U .S. 404, 413 (1968) (stating that there needs to be an
"explicit statemenf to terminate treaty rights, which would not "be lightly imputed to the Congress");
Washington v, Wash . Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U .S . 658, 690 (1979) (determining that
"talbsent explicit statutory language, we have been extremely reluctant to find congressional abrogation
of treaty rights").
302 . Hualpat Indians, 314 U .S . 339 (holding that aboriginal title was not extinguished by a
railroad grant), 348-49 (by land grants to individuals), 351 (by a surveyor's report), 353 (by establishing
an Indian reservation), 354-56 (by actions of the U .S . Department of the Interior in moving Indians onto
the reservation) . See generally Frickey, Marshalling, supra note 25, at 412-17 (discussing so-called
"clear statement rates," as part ofthe canon of Indian document construction).
303 . Jones v, Meehan, 175 U .S . 1, 32 (1899).
304 . Cramer v . United States, 261 U .S . 219, 229 (1923) .
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between a tribe and a state. 305 Aboriginal title also enables the possessors
306
Moreover,
to maintain common law actions of trespass and ejectment
the Supreme Court repeatedly recognized that because Indian tribes were
not created by the United States, their sovereignty is not restrained by the
constitutional limits that burden other governments. 307
An overlooked legacy of the discovery doctrine, as enunciated by the
Marshall Court, is the impetus it gave to treaty-making. Since discovery
only gave an exclusive right to purchase, it became incumbent upon the
federal government to negotiate treaties with Indian tribes to gain title to
lands for settlement . The following section examines some of the results of
those negotiations, especially as they relate to natural resources.
VI. A CONSEQUENCE OF THE DISCOVERY DOCTRINE :
NATURAL RESOURCES

TREATY

RIGHTS TO

The treaty-making period extended from the founding of the United
States until 1871, when the House of Representatives successfully objected
to being excluded from the treaty-making process and effectively ended the
treaty era. 308 Thereafter, Indian policy was made, and Indian reservations
established, only through statutes and actions of the executive."' This
established a new framework for making Indian policy, but these "treaty
substitutes" were considered to be the functional equivalents of treaties by
the government and reviewing courts, so the end of treaty-making had very
little actual substantive effect on the tribes . 10
Thus, the federal
Treaties are compacts among sovereigns .
policy
of
entering
into
treaties
was an implicit
government's
acknowledgment of the sovereign status of the tribes . The Supreme Court
305 . County of Oneidav . Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U& 226, 240 (1985) .
306 . See Johnson, 21 U .S . at 592 (noting that Indian title was a defense to an ejectment action);
COHEN TREATISE, supra note 21, at 523-24 (citing cases recognizing Indian claims for trespass and
ejectment).
307 . See, e.g., United States v . Wheeler, 435 U_S_ 313, 329-30 (1978) (stating that the
constitutional bar on double jeopardy is not applicable to tribal governments); Talton v . Mayes, 163
U .S. 376, 384 (1896) (finding that the constitutional requirement of indictment by a grand jury for
criminal prosecution is not applicable to tribal courts) .
308 . Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Star. 544, 566 (codified as amended at 25 U .S.C . § 71
(2000)) . Under the Constitution, of course, only the Senate may ratify treaties . U.S . CONST. art . 11, § 2,
ci . 2 . The objection of members of the House, which refused to appropriate money to carry out treaty
obligations until it was given an equal voice in Indian affairs, led to the termination of treaty-making .
The 1871 law did, however, validate existing treaties . See COHEN TREATISE, supra note 21, at 107
(detailing the events that led up to the 1871 Appropriations Act) .
309 . COHEN TREATISE, supra note 21, at 107 .
310 . See GETcHEs ET A6 ., supra note 29, at 152 (noting, however, that Indian reservations set
aside by executive order might be subject to governmental taking without compensation).
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has accorded Indian treaties the same dignity as treaties with foreign
nations . 311 There are at least two differences, however: (1) Indian treaties
can be abrogated with the clear and specific intent of Congress; and (2)
there are special rules of interpretation that courts use to interpret Indian
treaties . 12 These interpretative rules favor tribes, since courts assume that
313
the federal "guardian" has a trust relationship with its Indian "wards . "
314
Thus, courts construe treaties as tribes would understand their terms;
315
ambiguities are resolved in favor of the tribes; and treaties are liberally
construed in their favor. 316 But courts will not inquire into the adequacy of
a tribe's representation in treaty negotiations and will not attempt to
ascertain whether a treaty was procured by fraud or duress . 317
Many treaties, especially the ones early in the treaty-making era,
resembled foreign treaties by emphasizing "peace and friendship," calling
for exchanges of prisoners, and often including "mutual assistance
pacts "'31' Later, treaties frequently included promises of federal protection
319
Of course, the chief
of tribes and exclusive federal regulation of trade.
extinguish
Indian title,
treaty-making goal of the United States was to
which, because of the discovery doctrine, required consensual cessions of
land from the tribes .
In return for the land cessions, the tribes bargained for government
recognition of homelands. These land reservations formed the lion's share
311 . United States v . 43 Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U .S . 188, 197 (1876) ("[T]he power to make
treaties with Indian tribes is, as we have seen, coextensive with that to make treaties with foreign
nations .") .
312 . See Cough TREATISE, supra note 21, at 63 (explaining the process courts employ to
interpret Indian treaties) .
313 . See Charles F . Wilkinson & John M . Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty
Abrogation: "As Long as Water Flows, or Grass Grows upon the Earth "-How Long a Time is That?,
63 CAL . L . Rev. 601, 620-22 (1975) (referencing the differential treatment of Indian and international
treaties) .
314 . Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U .S . 620, 631 (19'70); United States v_ Shoshone Tribe,
304 U.S . I11, It 6 (1938) .
315 . McClanahan v . Ariz . State Tax Comm'n, 411 U .S . 164, 174 (1973) ; Carpenter v . Shaw,
280 U .S . 363, 367 (1930).
316 . Choctaw Nation v . United States, 318 U.S . 423, 431-32 (1943); Choate v . Trapp, 224 U.S .
665, 675 (1912).
317 . See, e.g., Lone Wolf v . Hitchcock, 187 U.S . 553, 567-68 (1903) (concluding that the Court
will not attempt to determine if the tribe signed the agreement because of "fraudulent misrepresentations
[or] concealment") ; United States v . N.Y . Indians, 173 U .S . 464, 469-70 (1899) (determining that "the
treaty, after executed and ratified by the proper authorities of the Government, becomes the supreme law
of the land, and the courts can no more go behind it for the purpose of annulling its effect and operation
than they can behind an act of Congress" (quoting Fellows v . Blacksmith, 60 U .S . (19 How.) 336, 372
(1857)) .
318 . COHEN TREATISE, supra note 21, at 64-65 .
319 . Id. at 65 .
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320

of what came to be called Indian country,
within which most state laws
are preempted, even if the treaty or treaty-substitute establishing the
21
reservation did not expressly make state laws inapplicable .
Express
preemption was unnecessary because the courts ruled that the overriding
purpose of promoting tribal self-government would have been
322
compromised if state law governed in Indian country .
Thus, in light of
323
the favorable rules of interpretation ,
treaties and statutes are usually
construed "in favor of retained tribal self-government and property rights as
,324
against competing claims under state law.
In addition to islands of self-government, Indian country was
established to provide the tribes a means to a livelihood . But because their
reservations left the tribes with only a fraction of the lands they commanded
prior to the treaties or treaty-substitutes, their prospects for maintaining
325
their economic independence were poor .
Moreover, government policy
326
transformed nomadic hunting and gathering tribes into settled agrarians.
In the West, farming required water for irrigation, yet hardly any treaties or
statutes mentioned water. In order to avoid the prospect of having Indian
reservations become barren dust bowls, the Supreme Court used the rules of
interpretation to imply federal intent to reserve sufficient water for the
321
Since most
tribes to fulfill the purposes of their land reservations .
early
priority
dates
under
the
West's
"first
in
time,
first in
reservations have
right" system of water allocation, this judicial interpretation reserved for the
tribes considerable amounts of the arid West's most precious natural
328
resource .
320 . Indian country includes reservation lands, allotted lands held in trust, and dependent Indian
communities (mostly pueblos in New Mexico, which are owned by tribes in fee)_ IS U_S .C. § 1151(a)
(2000) (defining the term "Indian country"); see also COHEN TREATISE, supra note 21, at 34-38
(defining and discussing terms used in § 1151(a)) .
321 . See COHEN TREATISE, supra note 21, at 270-71 .
322. See id. at 273 (explaining that broad preemption of state laws in Indian country has been
consistently recognized as a necessary implication from the federal policy protecting tribal
sovereignty") .
323 . See supra notes 312-316 and accompanying text.
324 . COHEN TREATISE, supra note 21, m274.
325 . Id. at274-75 .
326 . Winters v . United States, 207 U .S . 564, 576 (1908) ("It was the policy of the Government,
it was the desire of the Indians, to change those [nomadic] habitats and to become a pastoral and
civilized people.").
327 . Id. (ruling that the tribes' cession of land to the United States was not intended to include a
relinquishment of all the waters, using the interpretive rule that ambiguities in agreements with Indians
should be resolved in their favor) ; see also 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 37 .01(b)(2),at 227 (Robert
E. Beck ed ., 1996 ed .) (noting that the Supreme Court reserved water for the Indians, employing the rule
of resolving ambiguities in favor of the tribes) .
328, See generally 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 327, § 37 .02, at 234 (providing
historical explanation of Indian reserved water rights) . Two significant cases in which tribes were
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Tribal reserved water rights are not governed by state law, 329 although
30
Moreover,
state courts may obtain jurisdiction over reserved rights .
reservation water rights may include the right to restrain other individuals
holding water rights from impairing reservation water quality. 331
Reservations include natural resources other than water. The Supreme
Court has consistently ruled that other resources are part of the reservation .
Thus, timber and minerals, what the Supreme Court referred to as
"constituent elements of the land," are part of a tribe's beneficial
ownership. 32 Submerged lands may be a part of a reservation's resources,
depending on congressional intent 333 Reservation groundwater is currently
the subject of disagreement among state courts, which have reached
conflicting results as to whether reservation groundwater is tribally owned
or subject to state contro1331
awarded a total of over a million and a half-million acre-feet of water are Arizona v. California, 373
U.S. 546, 596, 600 (1963), and In re Gen, Adjudication ofAll Rights to Use Water in the Big7/orn River
Sys,, 753 P .2d 76, 77 (Wyo . 1988) .
329 . Tribal reserved rights are federally created rights . Therefore, they are not subject to state
rules requiring diversions of water for beneficial use and making water rights defensible if they are not
used . See 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 327, § 37 .01(c), at 232 (explairdng the problems
federally created rights create for state administrators and water rights holders).
330 . Under the McCarran Amendment, 43 U .S.C . § 666(a) (2000), the federal government may
be required to participate in streamwide adjudications conducted by state courts . Although state courts
must respect federal law, several Supreme Court rulings have affirmed state court jurisdiction, and state
courts have usually interpreted the scope of federal water rights quite narrowly . 4 WATERS AND WATER
RIGHTS, supra note 327, § 37.04(a), at 273 . For a critical discussion of the McCarran Amendment, see
Stephen M . Feldman, The Supreme Court's New Sovereign Immunity Doctrine and the McCarron
Amendment: Toward Ending State Adjudication of Indian Water Rights, 18 HARv . ENVTL . L. REv . 43 3
(1994) .
331 . United States v . Gila Valley Irrigation Dist., 920 F . Supp . 1444, 1445 (D . Ariz. 1996) .
332 . United States v . Shoshone Tribe of Indians, 304 U .S . 111, 116 (1938). Reservation
resources are owned beneficially because the United States retains legal ownership, or what the
Shoshone Tribe Court called "only the naked fee." Id. This split estate imposes on the federal
government a fiduciary responsibility to ensure that tribal resources are not wasted . See infra notes
352-56 and accompanying text. Further, under the Trade and Intercourse Act, the federal government
must approve conveyances of all ttribd property, including leases . 25 U.S .C. § 177 (2000) .
333 . Submerged lands are subject to conflicting state claims under the equal footing doctrine,
which presumes, in part, that submerged lands are conveyed to state ownership upon statehood See
Montana v . United States, 450 U .S . 544, 544-45 (1981) (holding that submerged lands bisecting a
reservation were owned by the state) . But cf. Idaho v . United States, 533 U .S . 262, 276 (2001)
(reiterating the district court's holding that submerged lands are owned by the tribe due to congressional
recognition of an executive action recognizing the lands as tribally owned) ; Choctaw Nation v .
Oklahoma, 397 U .S . 620, 631 (1970) (reasoning that submerged land was owned by the tribe due to
treaty language granting reservation lands in fee and promising that they would not become part of any
state) .
334 . Compare In re Gen, Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River Sys,,
753 P .2d 76, 99 (Wyo, 1988) (holding that groundwater was not a reserved water right), with In re Gen .
Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River Sys. & Source, 989 P .2d 739, 745 (Ariz.
1999) (considering and rejecting the Big Horn court's holding, finding its reasoning unpersuasive, and
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Some tribes have rights to off-reservation resources. For example,
tribes in the Pacific Northwest and Great Lakes negotiated express treaty
provisions giving them the right to hunt, fish, and gather on lands off their
336
35
These off-reservation usufructuary rights can either be
reservations .
location-specific-for example, at "usual and accustomed" fishing
337
locations-- or generic-for example, at all "open and unclaimed lands."
The Supreme Court has interpreted the "right of taking fish in common
with" white settlers contained in many Pacific Northwest treaties to include
a right to harvest up to half of the available fish .338 Treaties in the Midwest
not containing the "in common with" language have also been interpreted
339
Fishing rights include implied water
to assure the tribes half the harvest.
ruling that groundwater can be a reserved water right if necessary to fulfill a reservation's purpose) . See
also United States v . Wash . Dep't of Ecology ; No. CO1-0047Z, at 8 (W.D. Wash . Feb . 24, 2003)
(unpublished order denying the Washington Department of Ecology's Motion for Summary Judgement)
(holding that "as a matter of law the Court concludes that the reserved water rights doctrine extends to
groundwater even if groundwater is not connected to surface water") ; Confederated Salish & Kootenai
Tribes of the Flatland Reservation v . Stoltz, 59 P.3d 1093, 1099 (Mont. 2002) (prohibiting the Montana
Department of Natural Resources and Conservation from processing or issuing "beneficial water use
permits on the Flathead Reservation until such time as the prior pre-eminent reserved water rights[,
including groundwater,] of the Tribes have been quantified") .
335 . See, e .g., United States v. Winans. 198 U .S. 371, 378 (1905) (interpreting a treaty with the
Yakima Indians that gave them "the right of taking fish at all usual and accustomed places") ; COHEN
TREATISE, supra note 21, at 444-45 (explaining how tribes secured fishing rights via treaty) ;
Menominee Tribe v . United States, 391 U .S . 404, 405-06 (1968) (concluding that "to be held as Indian
lands are held" in the Menominee Treaty "includes the right to fish and to hunt") .
336 . The Supreme Court has referred to usufructuary rights as "right[s] in land" and
"servitude[s]" burdening lands ceded to the United States, including private property. United States v.
Winans, 198 U .S . 371, 381 (1905). Usufructuary rights include hunting, fishing, and gathering. These
activities were central to the tribes' pre-colonial economy . See MICHAEL C. BLUMM, SACRIFICING THE
SALMON: A LEGAL AND POLICY HISTORY OF THE DECLINE OF COLUMBIA BASIN SALMON 65 (2002)
(discussing the native conception that natural resources, like salmon, are not for individual ownership,
but are gins to be passed to subsequent generations), available at http ://www .salmonlaNv .ne t (last visited
June 14, 2004) .
337 . See, e .g., Washington v_ Wash . State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443
U .S . 658, 690 (1979) (discussing a treaty provision reserving fishing rights at "usual and accustomed"
fishing locations); Crow Tribe v. Repsis, 73 E3d 982, 983 (10th Cit . 1995) (explaining that national
forest lands are open to hunting so long as they are "unoccupied" lands) ; Lac Court Oreilles Band of
Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin, 760 F2d 177, 182 (7th Co . 1985) (stating that public
schools, highways, and hospitals are not open and unclaimed lands) ; United States v . Hicks, 587 F .
Supp. 1162, 1166 (W .D . Wash. 1984) (holding that national parks are not "open and unclaimed lands") ;
Washington v . Buchanan, 978 P .2d 1070, 1082 (Wash . 1999) (noting that a treaty provision reserving
hunting and gathering rights on "open and unclaimed land" includes public lands managed for purposes
not inconsistent with the tribal usufructs) . Open and unclaimed lands may include areas outside of lands
ceded by a treaty if they were historically subject to tribal usufructs . Semen Bros. v . United States, 249
U .S, 194, 198-99 (1918) .
338 . Wash . State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U .S . at 658, 686 (noting that
the scope of the fishing right is tied to the right to "a livelihood-that is to say, a moderate living") .
339 . See Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v . Wisconsin, 775 F .
Supp . 321, 323 (W .D_ Wis . 1991) (holding, in part, that the "moderate living" standard is incapable of
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rights,341 the right to harvest commercially,341 and the right to harvest
hatchery as well as spawning fish 3 42 But it is not yet clear whether the
treaty fishing right entitles the tribes to a right to restrain habitat-damaging
activities . 343
Off-reservation usufructuary rights are durable. The Supreme Court
has ruled that they are not terminated by executive orders or treaties which
cede "all right, title, and interest" in lands without specifically mentioning
the usufructs.344 Moreover, a usufructuary right lasting "[d]uring the
pleasure of the President" does not give the President a unilateral right to
terminate the treaty right if the tribes caused no disturbances among white
settlers, since that is how the tribes interpreted the provision. 45 Usufructs
are not terminated by statehood, since such proprietary rights are not

determining the tribe's share of the harvest and that the "harvestable natural resources to which [the
Vibe] retain[s] a usufructuary right . . . [must] be apportioned equally between the [tribe] and all other
persons"); Lac Coure Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v . Wisconsin, 668 F . Supp .
1233, 1240 (W .D. Wis. 1987) (recognizing absence of "in common" language in treaty with Midwestern
tribe and that the tribe's allocation is determined instead by the "moderate living standard," but refusing
to allocate resource at that time); Lac Courte Orcilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v .
Wisconsin, 653 F . Supp . 1420, 1434 (WD
. Wis . 1987) (noting "in common" language employed in
western treaties and holding that Chippewa's usufructuary rights entitled the tribe to enough of the
resource "to provide them witi a moderate living") .
340. See, e.g., United States v . Adair, 723 F .2d 1394, 1410, 1414 (9th Cir. 1983) (explaining
that reserved water rights to preserve fishing rights have a "time immemorial" priority date) .
341 . See Lac Courte Orcilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v . Wisconsin, 653 F_
Supp . 1420, 1430 (W .D. Wis . 1987) (concluding that the tribe has the right to harvest offreservation
resources to which it has usufructuary rights and to dispose of them commercially) . Tribes may employ
new harvest technologies, Lake Superior Chippewa Indians, 775 F. Supp. at 322, but engaging in new
uses not practiced at treaty time, like commercial timber harvests, is not within the treaty right Lac
Courte Orcilles Band of Lake Superior Indians v . Wisconsin, 758 F . Supp . 1262, 1271 (W .D . Wis .
1991) .
342 . United States v . Washington, 506 F . Supp. 187, 198-99 (W .D. Wash . 1980), aff'd, 759
F2d 1353, 1360 (9th Cir . 1985). However, the existence of ahatehery does not make reserved water for
spawning fish unnecessary . Colville Confederated Tribes v . Walton.647 F .2d 42,48 (9th Cit. 1981) .
343 . One district court ruled that implied in the treaty fishing right is a right to restrain activities
damaging fish habitat, but that ruling was vacated on appeal . United States v . Washington, 506 F . Supp .
187, 208 (W.D_ Wash . 1980), vacated, 759 F2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1985) . Another court upheld a lower
court order to alter data operations necessary to protect fish . Kittitas Reclamation Dist . v . Sunnyside
Valley Irrigation Dist, 763 F .2d 1032, 1035 (9th Cir . 1985)_ See generally Michael C. Blumm & Brett
M . Swift, The Indian Treaty Piseary Profit and Habitat Protection : A Property Rights Approach, 69 U .
COLo. L . Rev . 409, 489 (1998) (discussing Washington, 506 F. Supp . 187, and the uncertain scope of
the right of habitat protection) .
344 . See Minnesota v . Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U .S . 172, 195-98, 200, 206
(1999) (employing the rules of treaty interpretation, especially the rules of interpreting ambiguities in
the tribes' favor and according to what the tribes likely understood).
345 . Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v . Voigt, 700 F .2d 341, 356
(7th Co . 1983), cert denied sub nom ., Besadny v . Lac Courte Orcilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa
Indians, 464 U .S. 805 (1983) .
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46
inconsistent with state sovereignty .
States may not, however, charge
license fees for the exercise of treaty rights 147 or impose discriminatory
348
Legitimate state
regulations under the pretext of resource conservation .
conservation and health and safety regulation is permissible, but must pass
heightened judicial scrutiny 3 49 Moreover, effective tribal regulation can
preempt state regulation . 50
Management of reservation resources has long been the responsibility
of the federal government, the legal landowner, for the benefit of the
352
equitable owner, the tribes . 351 Under the Indian trust doctrine, federal
mismanagement of timber and oil and gas leases has led courts to award
money damages because of the existence of comprehensive federal
regulatory schemes. 353 Of course, alleged mismanagement of money trust
346 . Mille Lacs, 526 U .S . at 204-05 .
347 . Tulee v . Washington, 315 U .S . 681, 684-85 (1942).
348 . Dept of Game v . Puyallup Tribe, 414 U .S . 44, 46-48 (1973) (striking down a facially
nondiscriminatory ban on net fishing, since it in fact discriminated against tribal fishing) .
349 . Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v . Wisconsin, 668 F . Supp.
1233, 1239 (W .D . Wise, 1987),
350 . Id, at 1241 . However, state promotion of tourism is not a valid basis for regulating the
"tribes' exercise of their usnfructuary rights." At at 1238 .
351 . This split-estate conceptwith the federal government holding legal title, and the tribes
owning the beneficial, or equitable estate-arose out of the trust relationship between the federal
government and the tribes . See United States v . Shoshone Tribe of Indians, 304 U .S . 111, 115 (1938)
(announcing that "although the United States always had legal title . . . it did not have power to give to
others or to appropriate to its own use any part of the land without rendering, or assuming the obligation
to pay, just compensation to the tribe") ; ROYSTER & BLUMM, supra note 271, at 131 (showing that the
split estate concept is important for separating title questions from usufructuary rights) .
352 . See COHEN TREATISE, supra note 21, at 220-28 (explaining the history and limitations of
the Indian trust doctrine) .
353 . United States v . Mitchell, 463 U.S . 206, 207, 211 (1983) (awarding damages for
mismanagement of timber resources); Jicarilla Apache Tribe v_ Supron, 479 F . Supp . 536, 547, 551,
553-54 (D .N .M . 1979), affd and rev'd in part by 728 F .2d 1555, 1560 (10th Cir . 1984), rev'd en banc
per curiam 782 F2d 855, 857 (10th Cir. 1986) (adopting Judge Seymour's dissent from the panel
decision below). In his dissent, Judge Seymour would have afmedthe district court's decision finding
a breach of trust concerning oil and gas leases because :
[S]tricter standards apply to federal agencies when administering Indian
programs . When the Secretary is acting in his fiduciary role rather than solely as
a regulator and is faced with a decision for which there is more than one
"reasonable" choice as that term is used in administrative law, he must choose the
alternative that is in the best interests of the Indian tribe .
Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 728 F2d at 1567 (Seymour, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citations omitted).
In United States v . Navajo Nation, the Supreme Court overturned a decision of the Federal
Circuit that awarded damages m the Navajo Tribe in connection with coal leases because the tribe had
the "lead role" in negotiating the leases and the Secretary of the Interior had no comprehensive
management role. Navajo Nation v. United States, 263 F .3d 1325, 1332-33 (Fed . Ch. 2001), rev's( 537
U .S . 488, 502, 506-08 (2003) . The Court implicitly distinguished the Jicarilla Apache Tribe case by
noting that the Indian Mineral Leasing Act and its implementing regulations "address oil and gas leases
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accounts is the subject of an ongoing multi-billion dollar lawsuit.
However, there is no trust obligation concerning water rights, since the
federal government has conflicting obligations to tribes and irrigators under
ass But there is authority for the proposition that the
the Reclamation Act
federal government has a duty to protect tribal usufructuary rights affected
by public land management decisions. 56
There is no generic authority for federal regulation of land use on
reservations . Tribal land use authority over non-Indian reservation lands
has been crippled by Supreme Court interpretations of the continuing
effects of allotting reservations into individual parcels under the nineteenth
35'
This impulse, which dominated the late
century assimilationist impulse.
and
early
twentieth
century,
sought to assimilate tribal members
nineteenth
into mainstream American life by encouraging them to become agrarians. 58
Under the allotment policy, there was a dramatic erosion of the Indian land
base: from 138 million acres to around 48 million acres, of which some 20
in considerably more detail than coal leases," Navajo Nation, 537 U .S . at 507 n . 11 . On the same day it
decided Navajo Nation, the Court held that the United States breached its trust responsibilities to the
White Mountain Apache Tribe in United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, even though there was
no comprehensive regulatory scheme, because the language of the relevant statute indicated that Fort
Apache was to be held "in tmst," and the government had actually occupied and used the land . United
States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U .S . 465, 474-76 (2003) . This, according to the Court,
gave the government at least as much control over the trust property as it has over timber harvesting and
required the government "to preserve the property improvements ." Id at 475.
354 . Cohen v . Norton, 240 F .3d 1081, 1086 (D .C. Cit. 2001); see also John Gibeaut, Another
Broken Trust, A .B .A. J ., Sept, 1999, at 40, 40-43 (chronicling the story that led to one of the biggest
lawsuits brought against the United States).
355 . Nevada v_ United States, 463 U .S . 110, 128 (1983) . See generally Reclamation Act of
1902, eh . 1093, 32 Stat. 388 (codified as amended at 43 U.S .C. §§ 371-383 (2000)) .
356. Kandra v, United States, 145 F . Supp. 2d 1192, 1204 (D . Or. 2001) (concerning lederal
timber harvests and their effects on treaty hunting rights) .
357 . COHEN TREATISE, supra note 21, at 127-43 (providing detailed explanation of the period
of assimilation) .
358 . In the General Allotment Act of 1887 (Dawes Act)--one of the first statutes that attempted
to make Indian policy on a nationwide, rather than on a reservation, basis-Congress responded to the
poverty in Indian country (as well as to those who wished to obtain tribal lands) by breaking up
communally held reservation lands into individual parcels . The individual parcels could be sold to nonIndians after the expiration of a Heist period (usually twenty-five years), and many were sold or
repossessed for failure to pay state property taxes (which became due after the expiration of the trust
period) . General Allotment Act of 1887, eh . 119, 24 Star. 388, 390 (Dawes Act), repealed by Indian
Land Consolidation Act Amendments of 2000, Pub . L. No . 106-462, § 106(a)(1), 114 Stat . 1991, 2007
(codified at 25 U .S.C . 2201 note (2000))_ Other land was sold to non-Indians as "surplus lands"
immediately after reservations were allotted into parcels for individual Indians . Although allotment was
national policy for nearly a half-century, the allotment policy was terminated by the Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934, uh . 576, § 1, 48 Star. 984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S .C. § 461 (2000)) .
Its implementation took effect on a reservation-by-reservation basis according to individual statutes .
See generally Royster, supra note 297, at 77 (explaining the history and current state of allotment and
concluding that allotment must be "excised . . . from Indian Law") .
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million acres were desert or semi-desert . 59 Moreover, today more
reservations are burdened with a "checkerboard pattern" of alternate tribal
and non-tribal land ownership, which complicates land management and
has undermined tribal regulatory authority. 60
Judicial concern over the fairness of subjecting non-Indian, onreservation landowners to tribal regulatory control has produced several
Supreme Court opinions that have denied tribes the ability to regulate all
non-Indian activities in Indian country. 61 Initially, the Court ruled that a
tribe did not have the inherent authority to regulate non-Indian hunting and
fishing on non-Indian lands on-reservation unless : (1) there was a
contractual relationship between the non-Indians and the tribe; or (2) the
non-Indian activity "threatens or has some direct effect on the political
integrity, economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe ."362
Although tribes may not usually regulate hunting and fishing on non-Indian
lands, states may not regulate hunting and fishing of non-Indians on Indianowned lands. 63 Where allotment has destroyed the Indian character of a
reservation, tribes may not regulate non-Indian land uses on-reservation. 364
Nor can they regulate non-Indian activities on former Indian lands that are
now federal lands opened to the public365
Tribal taxation and court jurisdiction generally track the limits the
Supreme Court has imposed on tribal regulatory powers . Thus, tribes may
not generally tax non-Indian activities on non-Indian lands on
reservation, 366 and states may tax tribal lands unless they are in trust status
359 . See Royster, supra note 297, at 8 .
360 . See, e.g., HRI, Inc . v . East] . Prot, Agency, 198 F .3d 1224, 1231, 1234 (10th Cit. 2000)
(clarifying application of environmental laws "in the `checkerboard' area of the Eastem Navajo
Agency") .
361 . See generally Frickey, Common Law, supra note 25, at 43-48 (explaining the Rehnquist
Court's solicitude for the right of nonmembers of tribes to be free of tribal civil regulation) ; David H .
Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier .: The New Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian Law,
84 CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1620, 1626-31 (1996) (claiming that the Rehnquist Court employs equitable
balancing to resolve Indian law cases that is sensitive to modem social, political, and economic
conditions-and which is especially sensitive to non-Indian expectations-rather than Indian law
precedent) . See also David H . Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court's Pursuit of States'
Rights, Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267, 360-61 (2001) (criticizing
the Rehnquist Court for applying inappropriate legal principles, often used in other types of cases, to
Indian law cases) .
362 . Montana v. United States, 450 U .S . 544, 566 (1981) .
363 . New Mexico v . Mescalem Apache Tribe,462 U.S . 324,325 (1983).
364 . Brendale v . Confederated Tribes ofthe Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S .408, 430 (1989) .
365 . South Dakota v . nourland, 508 U .S . 679, 689 (1993) .
366 . Atkinson Trading Co . v . Shirley, 532 U .S . 645, 650-59 (2001) (indicating that the two
exceptions authorizing tribal regulation or taxation of non-Indians on non-Indian reservation lands, see
supra text accompanying note 362, are to be narrowly construed).
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and subject to restraints on alienation. 367 Tribal courts have no jurisdiction
over tort claims between non-Indians concerning an on-reservation
automobile accident, which occurred on a state highway open to the
public .368 Perhaps most surprisingly, tribal courts lack jurisdiction over a
damages claim against state officials conducting a search on-reservation
trust lands concerning an alleged crime committed off-reservation . 369
Except under the rather unusual factual circumstances of the latter case,
tribal regulation, taxation, and court jurisdiction over non-Indians seems to
extend to all tribal lands held in trust.
VII . DELEGATED AUTHORITY TO MANAGE THE RESERVATION
ENVIRONMENT

Unlike land use controls, environmental regulations are the product of
congressional delegation . All the major federal environmental statutes,
except the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),370 enable the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to approve tribal programs to
function as states for the purpose of implementing pollution control
programs . 71 But the pollution control statutes vary in terms of how they
authorize the tribes to assume implementation authority .

367 . Cass County v . Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 524 U .S . 103, 115 (1998) .
368, Strate v . A-1 Contractors, 520 U .S . 438, 442 (1997) .
369 . Nevada v . Hicks, 533 U .S . 353, 369 (2001) . The search had been authorized by a tribal
court, Id_ at 356. The tribal member subject to the search alleged that the state officials exceeded the
limits of the authorized search and sued in tribal court. Id. at 357 . The Supreme Court ruled that the
tribal court lacked jurisdiction to hear the claim. Id. at 369 .
370, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S .C. §§ 6901-6992k (2000) .
RCRA was subsequently amended in 1984 . See The Hazardous and Solid Waste Act Amendments of
1984, Pub . L . No, 98-616, 98 Stat, 3221 (1984) (codified as amended at 42 U.S .C . §§ 6901-6992k
(2000)); that same year, EPA instituted its policy of encouraging tribes to assume control over pollution
control programs on-reservation and began to curb state regulatory authority on-reservation. See Mary
Christina Wood, Fulfilling the Executive's Responsibility Towards the Native Nations on Environmental
Issues : A Partial Critique of the Clinton Administration's Promises and Performance, 25 ENvFL. L.
733, 756-57 (1995). These amendments, however, did not authorize tribes to implement hazardous or
solid waste management programs . See Backcountry Against Dumps v . Envtl . Prot . Agency, 100 F .3d
147 (D .C . Cir_ 1996) (holding that EPA lacks the authority to approve solid waste permitting plans by
Indian tribes because under RCRA the tribes are considered municipalities, not states) . However,
proposed amendments to the statute include a "tribes as states" provision. ROYSTER & BLUMM, supra
note 271, at 248. In the meantime, state-approved programs under the statute may not regulate onreservation, where EPA retains regulatory authority . Wash, Dep't of Ecology v. Envtl . Prot. Agency,
752 F .2d 1467-68 (9th Cit. 1985) .
371 . See, e_g Clean Water Act, 33 U .S .C. § 1377(e) (2000); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42
Ux .C . § 300j-11 (2000); Clean Air Act, 42 U,S .C . § 7601(d) (2000) ; Comprehensive Environmental
Response Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U_S .C . §§ 9604(d)(1)(A), 9626 (2000).
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The Clean Water Act (CWA) directs EPA to treat tribes as states for
the purpose of implementing water quality programs . 312 To qualify to
implement a CWA program, 373 a tribe must: (1) be a federally recognized
tribe with a governing body capable of carrying out substantial
governmental duties ; (2) be capable of carrying out its statutory
responsibilities ; and (3) have jurisdiction over the water resources it seeks
to regulate 374 According to EPA, fulfilling the latter criterion requires a
tribe to show that it possesses inherent authority to regulate the water
resource in question if the activity is conducted by a non-Indian on
reservation .375 This requires a demonstration that the activity has a "serious
and substantial" effect 76 on "the political integrity, the economic security,
or the health or welfare of the tribe .,,377 Although the Supreme Court has
construed this phrase narrowly,378 EPA's policy of avoiding
checkerboarded jurisdiction over reservation resources and treating water as
a unitary resource in which the actions of one user can adversely affect
another have led the agency to interpret the phrase in favor of delegating
implementation of CWA programs to tribes .371
372 . 33 U .S .C . § 1377(a) .
373 . Programs that tribes may administer include several grant programs, water quality
standards, permit programs for point sources and discharges of dredged or fill material, and nonpoint
sources, See ROYSTER & BLUMM, supra note 271, at 228 (explaining three major programs under the
CWA) .
374 . 33 U .S .C . § 1377(e) . The statutory language concerning tribal jurisdiction-"water
resources which are held by an Indian tribe, held by the United States in trust for Indians, held by a
member of an Indian tribe if such property interest is subject to a trust restriction on alienation, or
otherwise within the borders of an Indian reservation," id. § 1377(e)(2)-is quite similar to the Clean
Air Act (CAA) language, see infra note 384 . Nevertheless, EPA has interpreted the two statutes quite
differently, requiring a showing of inherent tribal regulatory authority under the CWA, but not under the
CAA . Compare 40 C.F .R . § 13L8(b)(2)(iii) (2003) (CWA regulations) (requiring the tribe to
"[dleseribe the types of governmental functions currently performed by the Tribal governing body"), §
131 .8(b)(2)(iii) (requiring the tribe to "[ildentify the source of the Tribal government's authority to carry
out the governmental functions"), § 131 .8(b)(3)(ii) (requiring "statement by the tribe's legal counsel . . .
which describes the basis for the Tribes assertion of authority"), with 40 C .F .R . § 49 .6(6) (2003) (CAA
regulations) (requiring the tribe only to establish, in part, that it "has a governing body carrying out
substantial governmental duties and functions") .
375 . 40 C .F .R . §§ 131 .8(6)(3), (b)(3)(ii) .
376 . Amendments to the Water Quality Standards Regulation that Pertain to Standards on
Indian Reservations, 56 Fed . Reg . 64,876, 64,878 (Dec . 12, 1991) (promulgating final rule codified at
40 C.F .R . In . 131) .
377 . Id. (construing Montana v . United States, 450 U .S . 544, 566 (1981)) .
378 . See Atkinson Trading Co . v_ Shirley, 532 U .S . 645, 650-59 (2001) (indicating that the two
exceptions authorizing tribal regulation or taxation of non-Indians on non-Indian reservation lands are to
be narrowly construed)_
379 . See RoYSTER & BLUMM, supra note 271, at 234 (discussing EPA's policy against
checkerboarding Indian land for the purpose of permitting control), 238 (recounting EPA's position that
water on tribal lands is a unitary resource) .
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Once EPA approves tribal CWA implementation, tribal standards may
be stricter than federal standards and may curb pollutant discharges from
off-reservation point sources, even ones with federal permits"° Tribes
may require non-Indian dischargers on non-Indian lands on-reservation to
obtain discharge permits. 81 In the latter case, a court agreed with EPA that
the tribe had inherent sovereign authority over water pollution because it
substantially threatened the health and welfare of the tribe. 382
In contrast to the CWA, where tribes must demonstrate to EPA that
they possess inherent sovereign authority to regulate, tribes seeking
authority to implement Clean Air Act (CAA) programs can do so without
making such an affirmative showing . 83 This anomalous result is due to the
fact that apparently only in the CAA did Congress intend to delegate to
qualified tribes the authority to regulate all reservation sources of pollution,
including those from non-Indian sources on non-Indian lands. 384
In the pollution control statutes, Congress recognized what Chief
Justice Marshall articulated over a century and a half ago: Indian tribes are
independent sovereigns . They are, in Marshall's words, "domestic
dependent nations,"385 now subject to the plenary power of the federal
government, but insulated in important ways from state control . The
pollution control statutes give tribes the opportunity to exercise that
sovereignty to protect the reservation environment. It is true that this
sovereignty is exercised by virtue of congressional delegation, not by the
inherent sovereignty that Chief Justice Marshall articulated. Nonetheless,
functionally-at least in the pollution control area-tribes are essentially
treated the same as states . 86
380 . Albuquerque v . Browner, 97 F .3d 415, 423-24 (10th Cir. 1996) .
381 . Montana v . Envtl . Prot . Agency, 137 F .3d 1135, 1141 (9th Lit. 1998), cert denied, 521
U_S . 921 (1998)_
382 . Id
383 . Ariz. Pub . Sm . Co . v . Envtl . Prot . Agency, 21 I F .3d 1280, 1288 (D.C . Cir. 2000) .
384 . The apparent distinction between the CWA and the CAA is hard to see from a comparison
of the text of the statutes . The CAA, which EPA and the courts have interpreted to be a direct
delegation to EPA to approve tribal regulatory programs governing reservation air pollution regardless
of land ownership, authorizes tribal air programs operating "within the exterior boundaries of the
reservation or other areas within the tribe's jurisdiction ." 42 U .S .C . § 7601(d)(2)(B) (2000) . The CWA,
under which EPA requires tribes to demonstrate inherent regulatory authority, see supra text
accompanying note 382, authorizes tribal water pollution programs for waters "held by an Indian tribe,
held by the United States in trust for the Indians, held by a member of an Indian tribe if such property
interest is subject to a trust restriction on alienation, or otherwise within the borders of an Indian
reservation ;" 33 U .S .C. § 1377(e)(2) (2000) . Both statutes seem to envision that qualified tribes would
regulate all reservation resources, regardless of landownership .
385 . Cherokee Nation v . Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet) 1, 17 (1831) .
386 . Like states, tribes are subject to federal oversight . For example, under the CWA tribal
permits are subject to potential federal veto . See 33 U .S .C. § 1342(c)(3) (discussing EPA's overall
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CONCLUSION
The discovery doctrine, as articulated by Chief Justice Marshall and his
colleagues, has been misunderstood. The doctrine allocated rights among
European "discoverers" to the New World, but left the Indian tribes in
possession of their lands with, in Marshall's words, "a legal as well as just
38'
claim to retain possession of [them] ."
Although Marshall did refer to the
388
Indians as occupants,
the natives held Indian title, which, according to
.,,389
the Supreme Court, is as "sacred as the fee
Sometimes disparaged as a
390 i
mere "right of occupancy,"
n truth, aboriginal title included all
ownership rights except the right to transfer alienable title to any person
other than the discovering government. All the government obtained from
discovery was an exclusive right of preemption : the right to purchase Indian
title.
However, by conceptualizing Indian title as a proprietary interest
foreign to the Anglo-American tenurial system, Chief Justice Marshall
sowed the seeds of misunderstanding . Indian title-with all rights of use,
possession, and development-should have been identified as a fee simple .
But it is true that this fee simple was burdened with the government's right
of preemption, imposing a severe, but partial restraint on alienation . Yet
this sort of property interest is well within the confines of traditional Anglo91
American law.
Marshall's failure to embrace Indian title as part of
Anglo-American law equipped subsequent courts with the discretion to
misconstrue the nature of Indian title and, for example, to deny tribes just
392 Chief Justice Marshall did not write those
compensation for its seizure.
393 for the Marshall
later opinions and would not likely have endorsed them,
Court decisions left all the Indians' property rights intact, except the right
of free alienation . The discovery doctrine denied the natives this stick in
394
the property bundle of rights for national security reasons
and because,

authority to approve the program) . EPA may also promulgate water quality standards for waters under
tribal jurisdiction that fail to meet the C WA's requirements, id. § 1313(6), and may also promulgate air
quality implementaion plans that fail to meet the CAA's requirements . 42 U .S .C § 7410(c)(1)(A),
387. Johnson v . M'Intosh, 21 U .S . (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823) .
388 . Id. ; see also supra notes 158-61, 164, 173 and accompanying text,
389 . Mitchel v . United States, 34 U .S. (9 Pet .) 711, 746 (1835) ; see also cases cited supra notes
13, 288 and accompanying text.
390 . Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v, United States, 348 U .S . 272, 279 (1955) .
391 . See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text .
392 . See cases cited supra notes 15, 172, 185, 300 and accompanying text .
393, See supra notes 207, 221 and accompanying text (noting Chief Justice Marshall's
sympathies with the plight of the Indians) .
394 . See supra notes 176-77 and accompanying text.
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by the time the Marshall Court addressed the issue, there was widespread
reliance on land titles derived from the government 395
*
system in Fletcher
Had the Chief Justice not embraced a dual tenurial
v. PecP96-which made Indian title a kind of sui generis property right that
could be interpreted by other courts unrestrained by Anglo-American
property rules-the Indians' property interest would have been described as
a fee simple subject to a right of preemption of the government because,
Chief Justice Marshall's
functionally, that is what it was3 9'
mischaracterization of the Indian property rights ultimately led to
unfortunate results, but those infringements on tribal rights were the
product of jurists who were not members of the Marshall Court. 398
In addition to the discovery doctrine's proprietary implications, the
doctrine had significant, if not immediately apparent, effects on tribal
sovereignty . The common law discovery doctrine, as interpreted by the
Marshall Court, excluded all competing European nations except the
discovering nation from dealing with the resident Indians.3" The Anglo400
American version of discovery forbade private purchases of Indian lands.
Later, Chief Justice Marshall ruled that the federal Constitution, statutes,
and treaties, reserved the power to terminate Indian title and regulate Indian
affairs exclusively to the federal government'4" States and settlers could
not terminate Indian title; only negotiations between the federal government
and the tribes could. This encouraged a century of federal Indian treaties,
bilateral agreements aimed at clarifying both Indian rights and
governmental obligations . Many tribes were able to employ the treatymaking process to reserve significant rights to lands and natural resources,
4°2
including water rights and off-reservation harvest rights
395 . See quoted text aceompanyingsupra note 203 .
396. Fletcher v . Peck, IO U .S . (6 Crunch) 87, 142-43 (1810) ; see supra note 105 and
accompanying text .
397 . See supra notes 11, 109, 164, 213, 216, 250, 254 and accompanying text
398 . See, e.g., cases cited supra 15-16 (no compensation for governmental takings), 293-94
(federal plenary power) notes 362-69 (Rehnquist and Burger Court decisions restricting tribal regulation
of non-members) .
399 . See supra notes 155-157 (exclusion of European competitors) ; infra note 401 (common
law nature) and accompanying text.
400 . See supra notes 56, 80, 1233-25, 168-69, 285 and accompanying text .
401 . The lands at issue in Johnson v. M'tniosh were originally sold by the Indian chiefs in 1773
and 1775, well before the Constitution was ratified in 1787 . Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U .S . (8 Wheat)
543, 571 (1823); TERRY JORDAN, THE CONSTITUTION : AND FASCINATING FACTS ABOUT IT 30 (7th ed .
2001) . Thus, the federalization of Indian affairs worked by the Constitution's Indian Commerce Clause
did not apply to the transactions at issue in Johnson. Instead, Marshall relied on the common law
doctrine of discovery to produce the same result had the land transactions been subject to the Indian
Commerce Clause and the 1790 Nonintercourse Act. See supra text between notes 190 and 192.
402 . See supra notes 335-43 and accompanying text .
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The discovery doctrine's effects on tribal sovereignty turned out to be
considerably more pernicious than its effects on tribal property rights . The
common law doctrine only prohibited the Indians from engaging in foreign
affairs with nations other than the discoverer-nation . In the Cherokee
cases, the Marshall Court interpreted the Constitution, statutes, and treaties
of the United States to restrict tribal sovereign relations to dealings with the
federal government. "°3
This was done to protect the Cherokee,
denominated by the Court as a "domestic dependent nation[]," from the
termination policies of the State of Georgia. 414 But in erecting this buffer
against the states, Chief Justice Marshall described federal-tribal relations
as a guardian-ward relationship,415 laying the seeds of what was to become
the federal plenary power doctrine in a later generation, a doctrine that
ultimately would prove disastrous for both tribal sovereignty and
proprietary rights . 406
Moreover, the poisoned fruit of the federal
guardianship prescribed by the Marshall Court was almost immediately
apparent, as the Jackson Administration embraced and carried out the State
of Georgia's policies by removing the Cherokee to lands west of the
Mississippi, along what became known as the trail of tears. 407
The end of treaty-making, the rise of the plenary power doctrine, and
the onset of allotment in the late nineteenth century had long-lasting effects
that even the rejection of the allotment policy after a half-century did not
curb .408 Most tribes now have checkerboarded reservations, on which nonIndian landowners are sometimes predominant. As a consequence, the
Rehnquist Court has undermined the inherent tribal sovereign authority
over Indian country that the Marshall Court recognized, and thus has moved
409 This has
toward limiting inherent tribal sovereignty to tribal members .
frustrated tribal efforts to regulate and tax all land uses on their
reservations .
The decline of inherent sovereignty over non-Indians on-reservation,
however, has been countered by congressional recognition of tribal
,4m
sovereignty in the federal pollution control statutes
These statutes
delegate authority to qualified tribes to control the reservation environment .
403 . See supra notes 267-71 and accompanying text .
404 . Cherokee Nation v . Georgia, 30 U .S. (5 Pet .) 1, 17 (1831) ; see also supra note 237 and
accompanying text .
405 . Id. at 17 ; see also supra note 238 and accompanying text.
406 . See supra notes 238, 293-300, 357-69 and accompanying text
407 . See supra note 281 and accompanying text.
408 . See generally Royster, supra note 297, at 77 (commenting that the "allotment [period of
Indian law seems buriedtoo deeply, imbedded too permanently to simply disappear of its own accord") .
409 . See supra notes 364-69 and accompanying text.
410 . See supra Part Vl .
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In effect, tribes are treated for pollution-control purposes as the functional
equivalent of states . In this respect, over the last quarter-century, Congress
has been much more protective of tribal sovereignty than has the Supreme
Court.
Thus, while the discovery doctrine may have indeed been a reflection
of Eurocentric ideology that afforded legal cover for colonization of the
New World, it left the natives with substantial legal rights, both proprietary
and sovereign . Those rights were diminished during the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, but they have not been eliminated .
The discovery doctrine has been called "nothing more than the
reflection of a set of Eurocentric racist beliefs elevated to the status of a
l12 It may have been
universal principle"411 and "a brilliant compromise.
both. There is no denying that the Johnson opinion included racist
references to Indians as uncivilized savages .413 But in light of the fact that
the vast majority of the land titles in this country originated in the federal
government and the British Crown, and given long-term reliance on this
state of affairs, Chief Justice Marshall hardly could have been expected to
produce a decision in favor of the land speculation companies who ignored
the proscription against individual purchases from the Indians, which would
have destroyed those settled expectations . The restraint on alienation the
discovery doctrine imposed on Indian title did limit the Indians to federal
land sales, but left all other proprietary rights intact. Despite the federal
monopsony power ,414 the tribes were able to employ the federal treatymaking process to obtain recognition of important proprietary rights that
have survived through the centuries. The discovery doctrine's limit on the
sovereign authority of Indians to deal with governments other than the
discovering government laid the foundation for buffering tribes from state
laws, while authorizing federal plenary power. The latter would prove to
make a mockery of the guardianship the Marshall Court envisioned . The
411 . W auASas, supra note 3, at 326 .
412 . Newton, Whim of the Sovereign, supra note 185, at 1223 .
413 . See Johnson, 21 U .S . at 573 ("[T]he character and religion of [the native] inhabitants
afforded an apology for considering them as a people over whom the superior genius of Europe might
claim an ascendency ."), 590 ("But the tribes of Indians inhabiting this country were fierce
savages . . . .") .
414. A monopsony is a market where there is only one buyer. Kades, Dark Side, supra note 10,
at 1105 n.167. Professor Kades claims that the federal government's right of preemption "facilitated
low-cost acquisition of Indian lands by stifling bidding by Americans for Indian land ." !d. at 1105 . As I
explained above, see supra note 216, 1 question whether the tribes would have been better served by a
free-wheeling market whose participants would have included land-hungry settlers, miners, and
speculators . At any rate, I am quite convinced that Chief Justice Marshall did not endorse the rule of
exclusive federal purchase to reduce the costs of acquiring Indian lands; he viewed the rule as one
protective of Indian land rights .
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current Supreme Court seems intent on dismantling most of what remains
of tribal sovereignty over non-Indians, even as Congress, through many of
the pollution control laws, delegates important sovereign authorities to
tribes to regulate comprehensively the environment of Indian reservations .
The discovery doctrine, nearly two centuries after the Marshall Court
articulated it, has left American Indian tribes with important proprietary
rights and tenuous sovereign powers, at least concerning non-Indians in
Indian country. Understanding its origins, scope, and legacy remains
foundational for articulating the nature and scope of native rights in the
modern world.

